Political realism, legitimacy, and a place for external critique

Abstract

Political realists claim that politics should be regulated by a distinctive political normativity, one that does not rely on external, pre-political moral standards. It is in this sense that they distinguish political realism from ‘political moralism’, regarded as an approach that understands political theory as applied ethics. Importantly, realists’ anti-moralism is not motivated by the conviction that moral considerations do not play any role in the political realm. Rather, the target is the externalism of the normative resources on which moralist theories typically ground their conceptions of legitimacy. In contrast to moralists, some realists have argued for the need to elaborate internal theories of legitimacy, ones that develop normativity internally – that is, from within the political context under evaluation. This commitment entails the effort to reconnect legitimacy to the beliefs and attitudes of people subjected to the political power. In these accounts of legitimacy, critique is typically exercised internally, by means of self-reflection and ideology critique. Contra some realists, I argue that some forms of externalism are desirable and compatible with internalist accounts of legitimacy, and I show how to accommodate them within internalist theories of legitimacy. They are desirable because they strengthen the emancipatory potential of internal reflection and, in some cases, even stimulate it, as when, because of political circumstances, internal critique cannot be exercised. In addition, they prevent internalist approaches from falling into descriptive accounts of de facto acceptance of power. These forms of external critique can be compatible with internalist accounts of legitimacy, provided that they do not contrast with what I call methodological and substantive internalism. Accordingly, in the article, I discuss which stances of external critique can and should be accommodated within internalist accounts of legitimacy, without renouncing to the realist character of the approach.

Political realism and the quest for political progress

“…Recall that for realists, political standards must have a bottom‐up source; that is, they need to be extrapolated from the political practice. Put differently, the ordering principles of a political community must match the values that are salient for the subjects living in that political community (Cozzaglio, 2021; Favara, 2021; Horton, 2012; Sagar, 2018; Sleat, 2014). Although the dimension of inclusivity considers the value of security as the primary and necessary one in a political relationship, we can plausibly expect that subjects require more than the provision of security and protection by the political authority.…”

“…Radical realists such as Rossi have interpreted it in epistemological terms in order to ground nonmoralistic vindicatory genealogy (Prinz & Rossi, 2017;Rossi, 2019). Others have taken steps beyond the CTP by developing internalist accounts of political legitimacy (Cozzaglio, 2021;Sagar, 2018). Still others have invoked it in order to delineate the difference between a political relationship and a relationship of domination, while eschewing an appeal to universal moral standards (Favara, 2021;Hall, 2017;Sleat, 2014).…”

“…Addressing this question is beyond the scope of this article, although it is surely a related inquiry. For discussion of whether political realism can develop a critique that is not purely internalist, we refer to the growing debate in the realist literature on the role of the theorist (for example, Cozzaglio, 2021;Favara, 2021). 12 As explained earlier, the three criteria of progress stem from an understanding of the facts of politics: the inevitability of conflict, the use of coercion as a last resort, and the distinction between a political relationship and a relationship of domination.…”

“…Addressing this question is beyond the scope of this article, although it is surely a related inquiry. For discussion of whether political realism can develop a critique that is not purely internalist, we refer to the growing debate in the realist literature on the role of the theorist (for example, Cozzaglio, 2021; Favara, 2021).…”

Editorial ‘Political Normativity. Critical Essays on the Autonomy of the Political’

“…For example, Williams (2005) claims that political normativity ought to be found in values "internal" to politics, which is therefore regulated by its own standards (Cozzaglio 2022;Burelli 2020). A prominent example of such a method can be envisaged in the realist elaboration of the concept of legitimacy, which realists claim must be prior to justice (Rossi and Sleat 2014;Sleat 2015) and be designed in a bottom-up way, yet without losing its critical power (Favara 2022;Cozzaglio 2021). Another path is followed by modus vivendi theorists, who rather justify political institutions by appealing to pragmatic forms of compromise loosely based on "prudential normativity" (Horton 2006;Westphal 2019).…”