Political preferences, revealed positions and strategic votes: explaining decision-making in the EU Council

Sullivan, Jonathan; Selck, Torsten J.

doi:10.1080/13501760701576643

Cited by 18 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…2006). Whereas text analysis has the advantages of being easily accessible to other researchers, reliable, and economical (Sullivan and Selck 2007), interviews can shed light on actual negotiations not noted in protocols and help researchers identify the most important negotiation issues and determine the salience of these issues for the individual negotiating parties. The downside, however, is that interviewees might have faulty memories or may be self‐serving in their responses, portraying situations to their advantage — the so‐called ex post rationalization (Bueno de Mesquita 2004).…”

Section: Data On State Preferences In Eu Negotiationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Structural, Domestic, and Strategic Interests in the European Union: Negotiation Positions in the Council of Ministers

Bailer¹

2011

Negotiation Journal

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Preferences are a crucial element for analyzing decision making and negotiations, but knowledge about which factors determine these preferences is sparse. Some quantitative and qualitative studies of European Union (EU) negotiations have assumed that the negotiation conflict dimensions in intergovernmental negotiations reflect market‐versus‐regulation approaches as well as a north–south dimension. In this study, I demonstrate that these findings can be extended to show that the relevant determining factors for negotiation positions are economic structural variables and the degree to which a country benefits from the EU. Furthermore, the domestic interests of EU governments better explain a government's interest in some specific issues, such as consumer protection or fishery policies, than do their partisan preferences. Moreover, I am able to show that in frequent negotiations, such as EU Council of Ministers negotiations, sincere preferences dominate; however, some factors, such as extreme salience, can increase the likelihood that a minister will choose a less sincere strategic position such as an extreme position.

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Section: Data On State Preferences In Eu Negotiationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Structural, Domestic, and Strategic Interests in the European Union: Negotiation Positions in the Council of Ministers

Bailer¹

2011

Negotiation Journal

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“…The Council has proven to be surprisingly effective in avoiding vetoes, votes and deadlock (Hayes-Renshaw, Van Aken, and Wallace 2006;Kö nig and Junge 2009). This behaviour is considered puzzling from a rationalist bargaining perspective, as member states refrain from using resources obviously at their disposal (Aus 2008;Sullivan and Selck 2007). Normative explanations were provided to solve this puzzle (Heisenberg 2005).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…About what happens at level I, most bargaining models tell us little. The bargaining process itself is commonly treated as a black box into which member states' preferences and capabilities are input (Sullivan andSelck 2007, 1154). Scholars claim that they do not need to engage themselves with 'the fuzzy informality of pre-decision bargaining' (Achen 2006, 88).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consensus and Isolation in the EU Council of Ministers

Smeets

2015

Journal of European Integration

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When and how are member states in a small minority or isolated position able to prevail in the EU Council of Ministers? The Council is known for its ability to avoid vetoes and votes. However, we lack a causal mechanism that explains how such a consensus is commonly reached. We argue that while domestic and normative constraints are necessary elements of an explanation of negotiating success, they are insufficient to solve the puzzle of isolation. We claim that success in isolation depends on the ability to avoid exposure at Council level, which in turn is related to the lower levels' effectiveness in preventing matters from reaching the ministers. We test this conjecture by means of a process tracing analysis of three cases of isolation. By analysing how the Council has dealt with situations of twenty-six against one, we come closer to understanding the internal dynamics behind the consensus-reflex.

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“…Text analysis has the advantage of being easily traceable by other researchers and being relatively cheap (Sullivan and Selck 2007). In contrast, interviews help to identify crucial negotiation issues and allow the researcher to obtain associated salience values, which are difficult to collect by means of text analysis.…”

Section: Data On State Preferences In Negotiationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A political economy of positions in climate change negotiations: Economic, structural, domestic, and strategic explanations

Bailer

Weiler

2014

Rev Int Organ

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Political preferences, revealed positions and strategic votes: explaining decision-making in the EU Council

Cited by 18 publications

References 36 publications

Structural, Domestic, and Strategic Interests in the European Union: Negotiation Positions in the Council of Ministers

Structural, Domestic, and Strategic Interests in the European Union: Negotiation Positions in the Council of Ministers

Consensus and Isolation in the EU Council of Ministers

A political economy of positions in climate change negotiations: Economic, structural, domestic, and strategic explanations

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