Political Pluralism, Disagreement and Justice: The Case for Polycentric Democracy, Julian F.Müller, 2020. London, Routledge. 235pp, £120.00 (hb) £36.99 (pb)

Abstract

London, Routledge. 235pp, £120.00 (hb) £36.99 (pb) One strand of political philosophy has traditionally involved debates about whether utilitarianism, egalitarianism, liberalism, libertarianism, or communitarianism are the correct first-order theories that express what justice requires our fundamental political institutions to be. On another strand of political philosophy, the fact of deep moral and political disagreement in modern societies is taken seriously and so involves debates about the second-order theories that attempt to show the best way to resolve or manage disagreement between first-order theories (e.g. public reason liberalism or political realism, or procedural democracy). It is to this debate between second-order theories that Julian M€ uller's book provides an original and insightful contribution on behalf of polycentric democracy.As M€ uller (p. 2) sees it, modern democracies are 'modus vivendi arrangements' because they are constituted by institutions that are beneficial for resolving conflicts in the face of deep moral and political disagreement, and yet the subject of mutual dissatisfaction, because people would rather move to what they view as the ideal political order if they could persuade those who disagree with them. What causes modus vivendi arrangements is that modern societies contain reasonable people who disagree both about the empirical matters and about the fundamental moral and political matters that would settle what institutions under which they ought to live. According to M€ uller, the problem facing people in democracies is then how best to escape such arrangements? M€ uller's answer in the book is to adopt a polycentric democracy. Chapters 1-5 detail the problem of a modus vivendi, what will count as a solution, and how extant approaches fail. Chapters 6-8 introduce the idea of 'polycentrism' and argue for its epistemic merits over collective deliberation. Chapters 9-10 then apply 'polycentrism' to democracy and make the case for it on the basis of two arguments.To motivate his case for polycentric democracy, M€ uller canvases three representative second-order theories and argues all fail to show how reasonable people can escape a modus vivendi. This involves subjecting John Rawls's theory of Justice as Fairness in A Theory of Justice, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson's theory of deliberative democracy, and James Buchanan's theory of constitutional economics, to what M€ uller (p. 20) calls the 'representatives of comprehensive doctrines test' (RoCD test). This is a test of whether a realistic jury representing the major philosophical and political factions in a democracy (eg. utilitarians, egalitarians, deliberative democrats, realists, classical liberals, and natural rights libertarians) would find the theory conclusively justified or a Pareto improvement over the current modus vivendi arrangements.