Political Parties, Interest Groups, and Unequal Class Influence in American Policy

Grossmann, Matt; Mahmood, Zuhaib; Isaac, William

doi:10.1086/711900

Cited by 21 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…28 Before considering how variation 24 Describing interests' preferences using partisanship does not account for ideological distinctions among interests sharing partisan inclinations. However, in polarized environments like those characterizing the Clinton and Obama administrations, interests typically forge partisan ties (Grossmann, Mahmood, and Isaac 2021). 25 "Alphabetical Listing of Industries," Center for Responsive Politics, https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/alphalist.php.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As only two recent Democratic administrations have disclosed their visitor logs, this paper cannot directly address how some forms of contextual variation, such as presidents' partisanship and institutional changes affecting presidents' engagement abilities, may condition engagement. In the former case, presidents of both parties face the same engagement incentives, but Republicans' closer alignment with well-resourced business interests could augment the effect of resources on engagement for Republican presidents (Grossmann, Mahmood, and Isaac 2021). In the latter instance, the creation of OPL and its ability to coordinate engagement may enable modern presidents to more efficiently align interactions with interests with their goals than in previous periods.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 24 Describing interests’ preferences using partisanship does not account for ideological distinctions among interests sharing partisan inclinations. However, in polarized environments like those characterizing the Clinton and Obama administrations, interests typically forge partisan ties (Grossmann, Mahmood, and Isaac 2021). …”

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confidence: 99%

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The President Will See Whom Now? Presidential Engagement with Organized Interests

Miller

2022

Am Polit Sci Rev

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Though presidents often criticize organized interests, presidents also expend considerable effort engaging them. Using original elite interviews, a survey of lobbyists, and administrative data, I consider how this engagement manifests, why presidents engage interests, and with which interests presidents engage. Unlike in other institutions, presidents exercise substantial control over engagement with interests, and they engage to mobilize interests’ institutional resources in service of their goals. To optimize mobilization, presidents focus engagement on well-resourced interests and interests who share presidents’ preferences. Pairing over seven million White House visitor log entries from two administrations with lobbying and campaign finance records, I demonstrate that presidential engagement is informed by interests’ electoral and policy resources and partisan alignment, though these characteristics’ substantive effects are modest. My findings highlight coalition building with interests as an underappreciated source of presidential power and elucidate the degree to which presidents amplify the political voice of well-resourced and copartisan interests.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The President Will See Whom Now? Presidential Engagement with Organized Interests

Miller

2022

Am Polit Sci Rev

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“…Since at least Schattschneider (1960), political scientists have been concerned about elite influence in representative institutions. Recently, scholars have focused more attention on whether out-sized economic resources afford political actors privileged access and influence in the policymaking process (Bartels 2008; Bowman 2020; Gilens 2012; Grossmann and Isaac n.d.; Hacker and Pierson 2010; Jacobs and Skocpol 2005; Lax et al 2019; McKay 2018; Schlozman et al 2012). While some have questioned the relationship between economic resources and political clout (Ansolabehere et al 2003; Baumgartner et al 2009; Branham et al 2017; Enns et al 2014; McCarty and Rothenberg 1996; Prasad 2018; Witko et al, 2021), other research has documented that greater economic resources afford wealthy campaign donors and private sector businesses more opportunities to shape public policy (Drutman 2015; Hall and Wayman 1990; Hertel-Fernandez et al 2018; Miler 2010; Miler 2018; McKay 2012; Kalla and Broockman 2016; Page and Gilens 2017).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

More than Mere Access: An Experiment on Moneyed Interests, Information Provision, and Legislative Action in Congress

Furnas

LaPira

Hertel‐Fernandez

et al. 2022

Political Research Quarterly

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Campaign donors and corporate interests have greater access to Congress, and the legislative agenda and policy outcomes reflect their preferences. How this privileged access converts into influence remains unclear because petitioner-legislator interactions are unobserved. In this article, we report the results of an original survey experiment of 436 congressional staffers. The vignette manipulates a petitioner’s identity, the substance of the request, and the supporting evidence being offered. We test how likely staff are to take a meeting, to use the information being offered, and to recommend taking a position consistent with the request, as well as whether they perceive the request to be congruent with constituent preferences. Donors and lobbyists are no more likely to be granted access than constituents, but staffers are more likely to use information and to make legislative action recommendations when the information source is an ideologically aligned think tank. Subgroup analysis suggests these effects are particularly strong among ideological extremists and strong partisans. And, information offered by aligned think tanks are thought to be representative of constituent opinion. Our results reveal the partisan and ideological predispositions that motivate legislative action that is more costly than merely granting access.

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“…Politicians and their staffs tend to measure public opinion imprecisely and therefore misperceive their constituents' preferences (Miller and Stokes 1963;Herbst 1998;Broockman and Skovron 2018;Hertel-Fernandez, Mildenberger, and Stokes 2019). They also respond disproportionately to co-partisans, the affluent, and the organized (Bartels 2008;Gilens 2012;Gilens and Page 2014;Lax, Phillips, and Zelizer 2019;Maks-Solomon and Rigby 2019;Wright and Rigby 2020;Grossmann, Isaac, and Mahmood 2021). Not only do these inequalities mark a departure from the democratic ideal that policy corresponds to majority opinion, they raise questions about how politicians learn about their constituents' views in the first place.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Conducting the Heavenly Chorus: Constituent Contact and Provoked Petitioning in Congress

Henderson¹,

Hertel‐Fernandez²,

Mildenberger³

et al. 2021

Perspect. polit.

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Congress hears more and more from everyday citizens. How do modern Congressional offices use this information to represent their constituents? Drawing on original interviews and a survey of Congressional staff, we explore how representation works in practice when new data and tools, such as databases and downscaled public opinion polls, are available. In contrast with established theories that focus on responsiveness, we show that representation is a two-way street. Congressional offices both respond to incoming constituent opinion and reach out to elicit opinions from stakeholders. Offices record correspondence into databases, identifying the most salient issues and the balance of opinion among correspondents. They tend not to use polls on policy. To understand the opinions of electorally influential constituencies, staffers also proactively reach out to stakeholders and experts in a practice we call provoked petitioning. If the Washington pressure system is a chorus, Congressional staff often serve as conductors, allowing well-resourced and organized constituents, including interest groups, to sing with the loudest voices. While Congress has some new tools and strategies for representation, its modern practices still reinforce existing biases.

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Political Parties, Interest Groups, and Unequal Class Influence in American Policy

Cited by 21 publications

References 20 publications

The President Will See Whom Now? Presidential Engagement with Organized Interests

The President Will See Whom Now? Presidential Engagement with Organized Interests

More than Mere Access: An Experiment on Moneyed Interests, Information Provision, and Legislative Action in Congress

Conducting the Heavenly Chorus: Constituent Contact and Provoked Petitioning in Congress

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