2011
DOI: 10.1177/1866802x1100300101
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Political Parties and Government Coalitions in the Americas

Abstract: is an Open Access publication. It may be read, copied and distributed free of charge according to the conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.

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Cited by 89 publications
(59 citation statements)
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References 21 publications
(21 reference statements)
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“…We argue that presidents in Latin American multi-party systems will adapt their policy position throughout the course of their term in response to the dynamic interplay of executive-legislative relations. 2 We assume that the primary goal of the president is to govern, that is, to successfully enact policy (see Alemán and Tsebelis 2011;Saiegh 2009aSaiegh , 1342, and, depending on her government status, she may have to build cross-assembly support to ensure the success of her legislative agenda (Alemán and Tsebelis 2011;Cheibub et al 2004;Colomer and Negretto 2005;Negretto 2006). Presidential bargaining, both through material resources-such as the distribution of pork-and policy compromise, is thus essential, and it is the choices a president makes while in power that "foretell presidential success or failure [and that] .…”
Section: Presidents and Policy Compromisementioning
confidence: 99%
“…We argue that presidents in Latin American multi-party systems will adapt their policy position throughout the course of their term in response to the dynamic interplay of executive-legislative relations. 2 We assume that the primary goal of the president is to govern, that is, to successfully enact policy (see Alemán and Tsebelis 2011;Saiegh 2009aSaiegh , 1342, and, depending on her government status, she may have to build cross-assembly support to ensure the success of her legislative agenda (Alemán and Tsebelis 2011;Cheibub et al 2004;Colomer and Negretto 2005;Negretto 2006). Presidential bargaining, both through material resources-such as the distribution of pork-and policy compromise, is thus essential, and it is the choices a president makes while in power that "foretell presidential success or failure [and that] .…”
Section: Presidents and Policy Compromisementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Some of the existing quantitative tests on cabinet formation rely on binary logit models, with the coalition or majoritarian status of cabinets as the unit of analysis (Cheibub 2007;Amorim Neto 2006). Other empirical studies that focus on which parties get into the cabinet often use as the dependent variable a dummy that indicates for each party in the legislature whether it is part of the cabinet (Alemán and Tsebelis 2011;Altman 2000).…”
Section: The Conditional and Mixed Logit Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Research shows that legislative factors determine how government goods are allocated between coalition partners (Amorim Neto 2006;Amorim Neto and Samuels 2011) and how presidents interact with coalition partners in the lawmaking process (Pereira et al 2008;Raile et al 2010;Pereira and Mueller 2004). It is therefore no wonder that legislative factors are also assumed to define which parties get into the cabinet (Alemán and Tsebelis 2011).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Studies carried out by these scholars have remained academic with little or no practical solutions to Uganda's political and policy development. Alemán and Tsebelis (2011) explain that political parties in the U.S. have failed to provide a clear position about their political party ideological orientation. The difference between the major political parties and political Ayeta et al 75 ideologies is far from a perfect match.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%