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This article critically analyses commonly used descriptions of Ukrainian politics as divided between ‘nationalist’ versus ‘pro‐Russian’, and ‘ethnic’ versus ‘civic’ forces which do not adequately explain Ukrainian politics or understand the roots of Russian military aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and 2022. An alternative framework is provided of competition between Ukrainian identity, which believes Ukrainians are a distinct people different to Russians, and pan‐Russian identity, which believes Russians and Ukrainians are ‘fraternal brothers’ who have always been and always will be united in the Russian World. The Euromaidan Revolution, Russian military aggression in 2014, increasing domination of Ukrainian identity policies and weakness of pro‐Russian political parties led to the progressive marginalisation of pan‐Russian identity in Ukraine. The marginalisation of pan‐Russian identity and unwillingness of Presidents Petro Poroshenko and Volodymyr Zelenskyy to implement the Russian version of the 2014‐2015 Minsk Accords, which would have transformed Ukraine into a Russian satellite, led to the Kremlin's decision to launch a full‐scale invasion on 24 February 2022. The goals of Russia's full‐scale invasion were and remain regime change (i.e., installation of a pro‐Russian puppet regime), destruction of Ukrainian identity (i.e., de‐nazification) and its replacement with a hegemonic pan‐Russian identity in a truncated (i.e., without Crimea and New Russia [southeast Ukraine]) Little Russian satellite controlled by Russia (i.e., de‐militarisation).
This article critically analyses commonly used descriptions of Ukrainian politics as divided between ‘nationalist’ versus ‘pro‐Russian’, and ‘ethnic’ versus ‘civic’ forces which do not adequately explain Ukrainian politics or understand the roots of Russian military aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and 2022. An alternative framework is provided of competition between Ukrainian identity, which believes Ukrainians are a distinct people different to Russians, and pan‐Russian identity, which believes Russians and Ukrainians are ‘fraternal brothers’ who have always been and always will be united in the Russian World. The Euromaidan Revolution, Russian military aggression in 2014, increasing domination of Ukrainian identity policies and weakness of pro‐Russian political parties led to the progressive marginalisation of pan‐Russian identity in Ukraine. The marginalisation of pan‐Russian identity and unwillingness of Presidents Petro Poroshenko and Volodymyr Zelenskyy to implement the Russian version of the 2014‐2015 Minsk Accords, which would have transformed Ukraine into a Russian satellite, led to the Kremlin's decision to launch a full‐scale invasion on 24 February 2022. The goals of Russia's full‐scale invasion were and remain regime change (i.e., installation of a pro‐Russian puppet regime), destruction of Ukrainian identity (i.e., de‐nazification) and its replacement with a hegemonic pan‐Russian identity in a truncated (i.e., without Crimea and New Russia [southeast Ukraine]) Little Russian satellite controlled by Russia (i.e., de‐militarisation).
ObjectivesThe aim of the article is to present the results of research and observations related to the phenomenon of vigilantism in the context of military operations in Ukraine.MethodsTheoretical research methods were used, such as desk research and literature study. Additionally, monitoring particular causes in Worldwide media has been carried out.ResultsIn the first months of 2022, during the ongoing Russo–Ukrainian war, an “unusual” phenomenon was observed on social media, namely the wrapping of suspected lawbreakers (e.g., marauders and petty thieves) with plastic wrap to structures, such as utility poles. In some cases, such individuals were whipped, chastised, sometimes even left naked and exposed to the elements, and open to mistreatment by passers-by. This raw form of wartime justice is loosely referred to in this article as “plastic wrap civil justice”, and is interpreted as a form of vigilantism. Several examples are provided in the context of the wider literature on vigilantism in times of war.ConclusionsIt is concluded that neither the specific phenomenon of “plastic wrap civil justice”, nor vigilantism more broadly, can provide a sustainable path to peace, civil security and a law-abiding society. In times of war, especially where social equilibrium is at risk and where conventional justice infrastructure, like policing, has broken down, some may take it upon themselves to implement their own form of justice, or vigilantism, in order to restore it. Although not a legally recognized form of justice, vigilantism may reduce crime. However, it introduces a parallel form of justice that may leave fellow citizens vulnerable.
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