Political Liberalism, Deliberative Democracy, and the Public Sphere

Abstract

Theorists of democracy emphasize the importance of a public sphere, distinct from the apparatus of the state, where citizens can freely associate, deliberate, and engage in collective will formation. Discourse ethicists and deliberative democrats locate the public sphere within civil society and the manifold associations that comprise it. For Seyla Benhabib, the public sphere is constituted by the anonymous “public conversation” of civil society. By contrast, John Rawls has a much more limited conception of the public sphere. For Rawls, public reason, which establishes norms for democratic discourse, applies to a limited domain. I defend Rawls's view against the charge that it depends upon an untenable distinction between the public and nonpublic spheres. I argue that Rawls's more limited “liberal” conception better guarantees the heterogeneity of associational life in civil society. I then argue that Rawls violates his own principles by partially collapsing the public-nonpublic distinction with potentially illiberal consequences.

Australian Muslim Responses to the Discourse on Terrorism in the Australian Popular Media

“…The controversy over the cartoons, it may be argued, illuminates the inability of Muslims to articulate their concerns, views or opinions in a language acceptable to the polity: the 'common currency of debate' (Charney 1998). Instead of informing the wider community of the concerns and issues underlying the debate on pictorial depictions of the Prophet in language that appeals to the community at large as citizens, the general response from Australian Muslims was limited to claiming their right not to be offended.…”

Seeking the "Counter," in Counterpublics

“…Others insist that public reason is not inconsistent with shifts in understandings of public and private. Evan Charney (1998) contends that "when matters once viewed as 'private' come to be seen as proper objects of legislation, such legislation is itself generally justified in terms of public-political values" (p. 99). Problems persist in these acknowledgments.…”

Two conceptions of conscience and the problem of conscientious objection

“…If conscience is taken to be by definition subjective, then conscience becomes something that cannot be assessed by public institutions and indeed, by any agent other than the one whose conscience it is. Conscience on this latter view would not even meet Rawls's standards for non-public reason, yet alone public reason 9. It is this conception of conscience that Schuklenk and Smalling rightly criticise.…”