Political isolation in America

Abstract

This study documents historical trends of size and political diversity in Americans’ discussion networks, which are often seen as important barometers of social and political health. Contrasting findings from data drawn out of a nationally representative survey experiment of 1,055 Americans during the contentious 2016 U.S. presidential election to data arising from 11 national data sets covering nearly three decades, we find that Americans’ core networks are significantly smaller and more politically homogeneous than at any other period. Several methodological artifacts seem unlikely to account for the effect. We show that in this period, more than before, “important matters” were often framed as political matters, and that this association probably accounts for the smaller networks.

Is America coming apart? Socioeconomic segregation in neighborhoods, schools, workplaces, and social networks, 1970–2020

“…The documented trends give substance to concerns about America's “coming apart.” As the joint growth of income inequality and segregation turns material divisions into social divisions, rich and poor Americans are increasingly unlikely to know one another or share the same spaces. When individuals across the income divide become entrenched in their own ways of life, among their own kinds of people, we are likely to see solidarity suffer (Paskov & Dewilde, 2012), trust fall (Barone & Mocetti, 2016), and politics polarize (Lee & Bearman, 2020). These findings speak directly to the theorized relationship between economic inequality and segregation which, when intertwined, consolidates the advantages of the rich, compounds the disadvantages confronting the poor, and erodes opportunities for social mobility (Corak, 2004, 2013; Nam, 2021).…”

“…Status homophily also breeds value homophily, or the tendency for people to form and maintain relationships with people with similar beliefs and values. As Lee and Bearman (2020, p. 3) find, since the 1980s, “Americans' discussion networks have become smaller, more closed, and more homophilous with respect to political beliefs.” For children, the socioeconomic status of the families in which they grow up can influence their access to social capital, which in turn influences levels of trust, civic engagement, religious involvement, and informal socializing (Wright, 2015, p. 642). Looking at trends in survey data from 1976 to 2009, parental education levels are strongly associated with participation in activities such as community service and church‐going (Wright, 2015, p. 647).…”

“…Scholars have also expressed concerns that economic stratification leads the rich and poor to become segregated spatially and socially: when the gap between the rich and poor grows into a fault line, social mobility plummets, solidarity suffers, and political divisions grow deeper (Klinenberg, 2018; Lee & Bearman, 2020; Mijs, 2019; Nam, 2021; Paskov & Dewilde, 2012). As inequality and segregation become intertwined, their social impact is likely to be of much more harm to equal opportunity, democratic politics, and community life than either of the two phenomena alone.…”

Neither influence nor selection: Examining co-evolution of political orientation and social networks in the NetSense and NetHealth studies

“…A now well-established line of work looks at the role of "political discussion networks" as either mitigating or amplifying existing political orientation among people. From this perspective, increasing largely homogeneous discussion networks function as "echo chambers," essentially amplifying existing opinions and attitudes and preventing people from being exposed to countervailing views [41]. People trapped in homogeneous discussion networks may become either more liberal or more conservative than people who discuss politics with a more diverse set of others and are thus exposed to countervailing opinions [42].…”

Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts

“…In any case, many partisans in the USA appear to live in areas where they have little exposure to out-party members 211 , 330 . In addition, over the past three decades, Americans’ personal networks have become smaller and more homogeneous in terms of political preferences, apparently because ‘important matters’ are increasingly framed as ideologically meaningful 204 . These developments have the capacity to exacerbate all three types of polarization, insofar as individuals bring their own political attitudes and beliefs into alignment with those who are spatially proximate 329 , 331 and tend to form negative impressions, including misperceptions, about those with whom they rarely interact 332 .…”