Political interventions in state-owned enterprises: The corporate governance failures of a European airline

Agency Theory in University Governance and the Role of Internal Audit: From the Private Sector Perspectives to the Case of Vietnamese Public Higher Education Institutions

“…There is a conflict of interest between "chief officials", who have incentives for larger budgets, and ministers, who prefer to eliminate any budgetary slack. The officials have access to more information [10].…”

“…According to [10], the corporate governance of SOEs refers to the ownership function of the state, the supervisory role of the government, the monitoring role of the board of directors, and the agency implications of contracts between the government and its agents. The principal-agent problem is the relationship among a series of conflicts of politicians, ministries, board of directors, and company managers [36].…”

Analyzing the barriers to putting corporate financial expropriations to a halt: A structural modeling of the phenomenon

“…Many studies have been found and examined, but few of them are reported here. These studies are appropriate to set the context of the current research: corruption as an institutionalized practice in Nigeria (Abdul-Baki et al, 2019); corporate failure during a recent financial crisis in the United Kingdom (Almamy et al, 2016); perceived crisis response during company scandal in the United States and Germany (Bowen et al, 2018); the corporate governance failure of a Romanian state-owned airline company (Dragomir et al, 2021); business risks and the future of small-and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs) in the Czech Republic (Dvorsky et al, 2021); finance capitalism, scandal, and financial crises in a Danish bank failure (Hansen, 2012); the devastating impact of corporate scandal on housing investment in China (Niu et al, 2019); corporate governance reforms in the United States and Italy after financial accounting scandals (Sorensen and Miller, 2017); a comparative analysis of European and American corporate scandals (Soltani, 2014); and scandal on the island of Sri Lanka (Uddin et al, 2017). Barkemeyer et al (2020) examined the role of media in changing from institutional to individual scandals.…”

Decentralising for local information? Evidence from state‐owned listed firms in China

“…There have been divergent views on the consequences of government involvement in state‐owned enterprises (SOEs), rooted in two distinct types of agency conflicts in SOEs. On the one hand, as the controlling shareholder of SOEs, the government may expropriate wealth of minority shareholders or depart from shareholder value maximisation to fulfil its political objectives (type II agency conflict, e.g., Bradshaw et al, 2019; Cong et al, 2019; Deng et al, 2015; Dragomir et al, 2021; Duchin et al, 2020; Lin et al, 2020; Liu & Siu, 2011). On the other hand, the government, as a powerful shareholder in SOEs, helps to monitor SOE managers whose interest is not aligned with shareholders (type I agency conflict, e.g., Fisman & Wang, 2015; Jiang & Kim, 2020; Ke et al, 2012).…”

“…objectives (type II agency conflict, e.g., Bradshaw et al, 2019;Cong et al, 2019;Deng et al, 2015;Dragomir et al, 2021;Duchin et al, 2020;Lin et al, 2020;Liu & Siu, 2011). On the other hand, the government, as a powerful shareholder in SOEs, helps to monitor SOE managers whose interest is not aligned with shareholders (type I agency conflict, e.g., Fisman & Wang, 2015;Jiang & Kim, 2020;Ke et al, 2012).…”