Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes, and Policy Outcomes in Venezuela

Monaldi, Francisco; Pacheco, Rosa Amelia González de; Obuchi, Richard; Penfold, Michael

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1814756

Cited by 11 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 26 publications

(33 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In addition, some readers might be concerned that some institutional reforms could have altered presidents' legislative powers during the period under study. In particular, institutional reforms-in Brazil (2001) and Chile (2005), and the continuous expansion of presidential powers in Venezuela since Hugo Chavez's presidency (Fuentes 2011;Monaldi et al 2006;Rosenn 2009)-could have produced some deviations in the index we employ to measure presidents' legislative powers (for certain years not taken into account by the Index). To rule out the possibility that these observations are driving or distorting our key findings, we run regressions after excluding these observations.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Investment in the Latin American Telecommunications Sector: Assessing the Role of Political Institutions

Kingstone

Ponce

2021

Politics & Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Political economists have argued that the design of political institutions bears important consequences for the quality of public policy, especially in areas like the privatization and regulation of utilities. Our study looks at how variations in key institutional traits of executive and legislative branches (specifically presidents' legislative powers, presidents' prerogatives to designate the director of the regulatory agency, and legislative fragmentation) affect investment in Latin American telecommunications, a critical sector for economic development. Institutional factors influence how easily executives and important political (legislative) parties can alter policies related to the telecommunications sector. We find that resolute institutional designs foster investment in the sector, but only under private ownership. For state-owned firms, decisive institutional designs have better effects on investment.

show abstract

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Investment in the Latin American Telecommunications Sector: Assessing the Role of Political Institutions

Kingstone

Ponce

2021

Politics & Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…For instance, AD's Rómulo Betancourt (1959Betancourt ( -1964 and Raúl Leoni (1964Leoni ( -1969 both won presidential elections by substantial margins, and the party controlled the Chamber of Deputies either on its own or in coalition. As Monaldi et al (2005) note, presidents from AD enjoyed strong partisan powers during this period-and they also substantially increased the state's claim on oil rents.…”

Section: Electoral Competition and Rent Capture In Venezuelamentioning

confidence: 93%

Endogenous Oil Rents

Dunning

2009

Comparative Political Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Oil rents may at times fall like “manna from heaven” into the fiscal coffers of the state. Yet politicians also make decisions that can increase or decrease the extent to which oil rents accrue to the central government. Though counterintuitive, various evidence suggests that politicians sometimes do not seek to maximize the state’s claim on rents. In this article, the author substantiates this observation with evidence from Venezuela and then develops a formal model of the relationship between electoral competition and rent choice. The author argues that the model can explain why politicians allowed the central government’s share of rents to decline in Venezuela beginning in the 1990s, even though a decline in rents plausibly contributed to the destabilization of Venezuelan democracy. The argument illuminates patterns of rent capture in other cases, whereas the model may be useful in many settings in which the gains from economic investment are realized over several electoral terms.

show abstract

“…absence of term limits on legislators that enabled party members to develop longterm careers in Congress, and (4) a proportional representation (PR) electoral system for legislative elections (Monaldi et al 2006). These elements, along with the functioning of centralized and disciplined parties, helped consolidate the party system during the 1960s and 1970s.…”

Section: Venezuelamentioning

confidence: 99%

Tackling the Resource Curse: The Role of Democracy in Achieving Sustainable Development in Resource-Rich Countries

Ahmadov

Guliyev

2016

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes, and Policy Outcomes in Venezuela

Cited by 11 publications

References 26 publications

Investment in the Latin American Telecommunications Sector: Assessing the Role of Political Institutions

Investment in the Latin American Telecommunications Sector: Assessing the Role of Political Institutions

Endogenous Oil Rents

Tackling the Resource Curse: The Role of Democracy in Achieving Sustainable Development in Resource-Rich Countries

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About