2009
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1821914
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Political Institutions, Intertemporal Cooperation, and the Quality of Policies

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

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Cited by 27 publications
(27 citation statements)
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“…37 If data availability were not a restriction, bureaucratic quality could be combined with two other similar traits of a polity that capture similar long-term investments such as judiciary independence and capabilities of the congress (Scartascini, Stein, and Tommasi, 2009). 38 This is the same source of institutional quality data used in Baltagi, Demetriades and Siong Hook (2009).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…37 If data availability were not a restriction, bureaucratic quality could be combined with two other similar traits of a polity that capture similar long-term investments such as judiciary independence and capabilities of the congress (Scartascini, Stein, and Tommasi, 2009). 38 This is the same source of institutional quality data used in Baltagi, Demetriades and Siong Hook (2009).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Such impressions are relevant from the perspective of capturing "beliefs," but it would be desirable to complement them in future work with more objective indicators of the strength and cumulative investments in each of those institutions. The indicators used here have been assembled within the context of a wider investigation, in which in-depth indicators were constructed for the case of 17 Latin American countries on the basis of expert surveys and comparative studies of public policymaking (IDB, 2005;Stein et al, 2008;and Scartascini, Stein and Tommasi, 2009). The indicators used here, compiled from international databases, show high levels of correlation with the other in-depth indicators constructed for the Latin American cases.…”
Section: Institutionalization Indicators and Constructing The Clustersmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…One of the mechanisms by which stronger congresses affect welfare outcomes may be through Previous work has measured and analyzed the impact of various features of policies (Stein andTommasi, 2007, andTommasi, 2007, within Latin America;andScartascini, Stein andArdanaz, Scartascini and, for a wider international sample). These variables include: Stability (the extent to which policies are stable over time), Adaptability (the extent to which policies are be adjusted when they fail or when circumstances change), Coherence and coordination (the degree to which policies are consistent with related policies, and result from well-coordinated actions among the actors who participate in their design and implementation), Quality of implementation and enforcement (the degree to which policies are implemented and enforced properly after the approval in Congress), Publicregardedness (the degree to which policies pursue the public interest), and Efficiency (the extent to which policies reflect an allocation of scarce resources that ensures high returns).…”
Section: More Institutionalized Congresses Produce Better Policiesmentioning
confidence: 99%