Political economies and decision-making processes in Latin America

Abstract

In this article, political economies have been linked to the decision-making processes of Latin American countries, before and after 1989. Conservative and liberal reforms have usually been applied through neo-oligarchic decision-making processes. Social-democrat economic policies have often been implemented with neo-corporatism. When “soft” populism prevailed, partitocrazia was the typical political instrument of lef tist governments, either if they governed or if they were at the opposition. Thus, they usual ly vetoed rightist presidents’ market reforms. The political consequence of “hard” populism has been authoritarianism, like in Venezuela with Chavez and Maduro. In “hybrid” economic policies, combining different models of political economies, there is not a stable decision-making process, and political conflict is usually strong.

Autocracy promotion in Latin America:

“…It was clear that Venezuela's political and social stability was collapsing. After Perez's impeachment in 1993 there was Caldera's presidency (1994)(1995)(1996)(1997)(1998)(1999) who managed economic policies inconsistently, implementing a form of moderate populism (Fossati, 2021).…”