Political Dynasties

Abstract

Political dynasties have long been present in democracies, raising concerns that inequality in the distribution of political power may reflect imperfections in democratic representation. However, the persistence of political elites may simply reflect differences in ability or political vocation across families and not their entrenchment in power. We show that dynastic prevalence in the Congress of the U.S. is high compared to that in other occupations and that political dynasties do not merely reflect permanent differences in family characteristics. On the contrary, using two instrumental variable techniques we find that political power is self-perpetuating: legislators who hold power for longer become more likely to have relatives entering Congress in the future. Thus, in politics, power begets power. Copyright © 2009 The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

Political Dynasties in Democracies: Causes, Consequences and Remaining Puzzles

“…However, Dal Bó et al . () reject the argument that members of dynasties in the US are simply the ‘best butter’ of American politics, and find that dynasty formation can be causally linked to the length of time a founding member holds office, suggesting a ‘power‐treatment effect’ of incumbency on dynastic perpetuation. Serving more than one term increases the name recognition, financial resources and political connections that potential dynastic successors can use to their electoral advantage.…”

“…This setting is of substantial interest to verify the generalisability of the findings from the US case analysed by Dal Bó et al . (). Elections in Argentina are based on closed‐list proportional representation in multi‐member districts rather than the single‐member district races characterising the US electoral system.…”

“…Interestingly, however, the results from Argentina corroborate those of Dal Bó et al . (). Rossi then takes the analysis one step further and provides two thought‐provoking pieces of evidence indicating that family name recognition is an important mechanism behind political dynasties.…”

“…Since the path‐breaking study of Dal Bó et al . (), however, academic interest has been expanding rapidly among both political scientists and economists. Political scientists have been predominantly interested in why political dynasties arise and/or persist.…”

A Theory of Top Income Taxation and Social Insurance

“…See Dal Bó et al . () for evidence on the persistence of political elites in the US. See Putnam () for a discussion of political elites in democratic societies.…”