Political Dynasties, Electoral Institutions and Politicians’ Human Capital

Abstract

This article focuses on political dynasties’ potential consequences, and particularly investigates whether and when they lead to the selection of dynastic politicians with relatively lower education levels. I exploit the different electoral constraints faced by distinct subsets of Italian local politicians to identify whether weaker constraints on political selection processes induce the selection of dynastic politicians with lower education levels relative to their non‐dynastic peers. The analysis – which covers almost 540,000 Italian local politicians active during the period 1985–2012 – indicates that a political selection process controlled by politicians rather than the electorate favours dynastic individuals with relatively lower levels of education.

Political Dynasties in Democracies: Causes, Consequences and Remaining Puzzles

“…The three contributions included in this Feature focus either on the causes behind political dynasties (Rossi, 2017) or on the consequences of dynasties for socio-economic outcomes (Folke et al, 2017;Geys, 2017).…”

“…In the first article, Mart ın Rossi revisits the notion that 'power begets power' using data from Argentinian parliamentary elections. This setting is of substantial interest to 3 In the Italian data set employed by Geys (2017) in this Feature, the share of female politicians is higher among dynastic politicians (19%) compared to non-dynastic politicians (17%) and politicians setting up a dynasty (10%). Moreover, while 26% of all female politicians in the data set are dynastic politicians, the same is true for only 22% of all male politicians.…”

“… In the Italian data set employed by Geys () in this Feature, the share of female politicians is higher among dynastic politicians (19%) compared to non‐dynastic politicians (17%) and politicians setting up a dynasty (10%). Moreover, while 26% of all female politicians in the data set are dynastic politicians, the same is true for only 22% of all male politicians. …”

Political Dynasties in the UK House of Commons: The Null Effect of Narrow Electoral Selection

“…For example, there is no evidence for an effect of franchise extension on the electoral success of dynastic candidates in the United Kingdom (Berlinski, Dewan, and Van Coppenolle ), while the introduction of term limits in the Philippines further encouraged dynastic persistence (Querubin ). A move away from elections that insulated appointments of aldermen from the democratic process has been found to lead to an increase in the number of local dynastic politicians in Italy (Geys ). Beyond the causes of dynasties, there is also some recent work on the differences in the behavior of these politicians: Dynastic politicians do not necessarily increase the quality of public services (Bragança, Ferraz, and Rios ), though they could channel more funds to their districts (Asako et al ).…”

Dynastic Political Rents? Economic Benefits to Relatives of Top Politicians

“…As for the consequences, a sizeable literature follows Fisman (2001) in investigating the value to firms of having political connections, often by conducting event studies of stock prices. A smaller number of papers examine if dynastic links between politicians generate differences in economic and social outcomes (Braganca et al, 2015;Labonne et al, 2015) and a growing body of work debates if relatives to politicians face a lower entry barrier into political office (Dal Bo et al, 2009;Querubin, 2013;Geys, 2017;Rossi, 2017;Van Coppenolle, 2015).…”