Political-Development Doctrines in the American Foreign Aid Program

Abstract

It is becoming increasingly evident, if it is not clear already, that one of the most critical problems in the overall modernization of the developing countries is political development. In South Vietnam, in the Congo, in Brazil, in Indonesia—all over the underdeveloped world, the capacity of countries to cope with their own problems, and consequently the stance of the United States toward these nations, turns in varying degrees on the successes or failures of the political system.

Interest-Based Development Cooperation: Moving Providers from Parochial Convergence to Principled Collaboration

“…There is little doubt that foreign aid enables the pursuit, promotion, and defence of the national interests of the donor nation, and that it has done so for some time (Morgenthau 1962; see also McKinley and Little 1977, 1978a, b, 1979. No country would provide aid if it did not serve-or was at least benign to-its own concerns and priorities (Packenham 1966). At the same time, donors are clearly capable of generosity towards, and solidarity with, international causes and crises-this is perhaps most visible in the case of natural disasters and humanitarian assistance (Lumsdaine 1993;Lumsdaine and Schopf 2007;Pratt 2000).…”

Foreign Gifts and US Imperial Ambiguities: The Kennedy Years

“…While in his "1961 Foreign Aid Message to Congress President Kennedy spoke of the goals of 'an enlarged community of free, stable, and self-reliant nations, '" in practice aid programs pursued "anti-Communist, pro-American political stability. " 81 On the one hand, US aid was meant to create goodwill, sending US taxpayers' money abroad. Its anti-communism was shared by allies' and clients' governments; the 1947 US Marshall Plan is one example of many.…”

“…83 On the other hand, US aid sought to immunize sovereign countries against real or imaginary communist inroads, helping Washington to contain Moscow. 84 More broadly, it symbolized and deepened Washington's ability to influence sovereign countries. It was unilateral, and sometimes even surprised recipients; the Marshall Plan certainly did.…”

Technical assistance for institutional capacity building

“…In the 1950s and 1960s there was much interest and effort in the US in transferring 'modern' administrative institutions, under the rubric of 'development administration' and 'modernization', to developing countries through its technical assistance programs as part of its foreign aid (Jones, 1970). Literature on the role of the US technical assistance to the developing countries for political and administrative institution development, reflecting this interest, has been substantial (Esman, 1962;Hamilton, 1964;Weidner, 1964;Packenham, 1965;Braibanti, 1966;Brown, 1966;Esman and Blaise, 1966;Duncan and Pooler, 1967;Malek, 1968;Trail, 1968). However, by the early 1970s, there was widespread questioning of the effectiveness of these efforts by scholars as well as practitioners (Jones, 1970;Weaver, 1970;Candido, 1971).…”