Political Determinants of Corporate Governance

Political instability: Effects on financial development, roots in the severity of economic inequality

“…Claessens and Perotti (2007) review similar channels. Rajan and Zingales (2003a) and Roe (1998Roe ( , 2003 in particular indicate that the strength of property rights is partly a function of how it is distributed: Our results here, with inequality-dependent instability damaging financial development, support these analyses. The degree to which each of these channels is in play is well worth exploring.…”

“…Pagano and Volpin (2005) and Gourevitch and Shinn (2005), the latter from the political science literature, argue that shifting coalitions among managers, employees and shareholders can explain the degree to which a polity will provide shareholder protection. Roe (2000Roe ( , 2003, from the legal literature, argues that for Western Europe and East Asia in the first post-War decades, the severity and nature of left-right conflict, and the effort to co-opt internal left-oriented groups and political parties, explain core financial differences in the post-World War II decades among the richer capitalist democracies. When labor power makes strong claims on firm's cash flows, he argues, concentrated owners have a comparative advantage over dispersed owners in forming a countervailing coalition.…”

Crossing the streams: HRM in multinational enterprises and comparative HRM

“…Institutionalist arguments head in the same direction. Arguments have been made that differences in such factors as legal systems (Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Salanes, & Shleifer, 2004;La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999, politics (Roe, 2003), or political systems (Pagano & Volpin, 2005) will impact the power of owners of businesses, creating differences between nations. Synthesizing these ideas and adding other institutional and economic differences, the comparative capitalisms literature (e.g., Amable, 2003;Hall & Soskice, 2001;Jackson & Deeg, 2008;Whitley, 1999) points towards differences in institutional arrangements in the economic, social and legal realm at the national level (Hollingsworth & Boyer, 1997) and their relative inertia.…”

The Taxonomy of Interdisciplinary Legal Research: Finding the Way Out of the Desert

“…For instance, the following preconditions are identified for strong capital markets: effective regulators, prosecutors and courts; financial disclosure; reputational intermediaries; company and insider liability; market transparency; culture and other informal institutions (Black 2001). And with respect to dispersed shareholder ownership, which is often seen as an indicator for developed capital markets, the role of not only company and securities law but also politics, history and private institutions has been intensely discussed in recent years (Roe 2003;Cheffins 2001;Coffee 2001;Pekmezovic 2007). …”