Political corruption in Eurasia: Understanding collusion between states, organized crime and business

Fighting Corruption in Russia: Its Characteristics and Purpose

“…Corruption has been institutionalized in Russia (Barsukova, 2009; Galickiy and Levin, 2013; Golovshhinskiy, 2013; Satarova, 2013; Shlapentokh, 2003) and manifests as a network in which low-level officials of any public institution give a portion of their illegal corruption-related incomes to their superiors and these, in turn, pass some of their gains to their own respective superiors (Barsukova, 2009; Kupatadze, 2015). In this context, corruption is perceived by Russian bureaucrats as a necessary mechanism for the development of their professional career.…”

“…In any case, it is very difficult to deny that modern Russia is characterized by strong centralized power and the concentration of economic and political power in the hands of a very limited group of people. In this respect, the Russian political regime is also perceived as corporative-authoritarian (Nisnevich, 2014: 76), with a lack of political competition and tendencies towards the establishment of an authoritarian state (Kupatadze, 2015; Tonkov, 2011).…”

“…Some researchers view the Russian economic model as a main factor hampering the fight against corruption. The 1990s economic system of oligarchic capitalism has been replaced by state-oligarchic or state-corporatist capitalism in which state interest has become the single regulator of social and economic processes (Barsukova, 2009; Kleiner, 2014; Kupatadze, 2015).…”

Constraints on the growth of private policing: A comparative international analysis

“…This model does not match post-Soviet private security development. Private policing in the post-Soviet region is often discussed incidentally in studies of organized crime and informal violence (see, for example, Driscoll, 2015; Kupatadze, 2015; Slade, 2013; Varese, 2001; Volkov, 2000). While some studies (e.g.…”

“… 5. Also, as compared to other developing countries, post-Soviet ones feature generally greater state capacity and stronger links between business and government (Kupatadze, 2015: 210). According to Levitsky and Way (2010) and Robertson (2011), informal coercion is characteristic of post-Soviet ‘electoral authoritarian’ regimes, as is cooptation of potential opponents (such as disgruntled police officers) with material incentives (Schatz, 2009).…”