Political Correctness

Morris, Stephen

doi:10.1086/319554

Cited by 411 publications

(280 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…If the firm introduced a high-quality product in the first cycle, the consumer welfare in the second product cycle would be the same across the two regimes since consumers have the same beliefs about the firm in both cases and behave in the same way. However, if the firm introduced a low-quality product in the first cycle, consumers can sort the firm into one of the two types depending on whether or not they 14 Morris (2001) calls this the discipline effect.…”

Section: Welfare Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One important paper that is closely related to ours is Morris (2001). As in Sobel (1985) and our approach, Morris (2001) analyzes reputational concerns that arise endogenously 3 Haan (2003) is another paper that develops a model of vaporware as a means of entry deterrence.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As in Sobel (1985) and our approach, Morris (2001) analyzes reputational concerns that arise endogenously 3 Haan (2003) is another paper that develops a model of vaporware as a means of entry deterrence. In his model, however, separating equilibria do not exist and all firms claim that they have innovation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Strategic Product Pre-Announcements in Markets with Network Effects

Choi

Kristiansen

Nahm³

2005

SSRN Journal

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It is a widely adopted practice for firms to announce new products well in advance of actual market availability. The incentives for pre-announcements are stronger in markets with network effects because they can be used to induce the delay of consumers' purchases and forestall the build-up of rival products' installed bases. However, such announcements often are not fulfilled, raising antitrust concerns. We analyze the effects of product pre-announcements in the presence of network effects when firms are allowed to strategically make false announcements. We also discuss their implications for consumer welfare and anti-trust policy.JEL Classification: L1, D8.

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Section: Welfare Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Strategic Product Pre-Announcements in Markets with Network Effects

Choi

Kristiansen

Nahm³

2005

SSRN Journal

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“…As a result, if the reform is not implemented today, it will not be implemented tomorrow. 8 See Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990), Coate and Morris (1995), Holmstrom and Ricart I Costa (1986), Prendergast and Stole (1996), Morris (2001) and Scharfstein and Stein (1990). 9 See Aghion and Bolton (1990), Milesi-Ferretti and Spolaore (1994) and Besley and Coate (1998).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…µ (Θ, g, 0) = 0, 0, θ R for g 6 = g M allows us to rule out this possibility and therefore to concentrate on blame-game strategies, the focus of the paper. 29 Since an anti-reform party always vetoes the adoption of the reform (by assumption 1(i)) and because of the unanimity rule, the reform is implemented only if both incumbents are of the proreform type. Thus µ (Θ, g, 1).…”

Section: Issue Salience In the Electoral Debatementioning

confidence: 99%

Blame-Game Politics in a Coalition Government

Déllis

2004

SSRN Journal

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An important question in political economics concerns delays in the adoption of socially beneficial reforms. The present paper explores this issue in the context of a representative democracy where the government is a coalition and citizens observe neither the decisionmaking process, nor the policy preferences of the politicians. It shows that a governing party favoring a reform may nonetheless choose to veto its adoption and blame its coalition partners for the non-adoption. This is referred to as blame-game politics. The rationale for playing such a game is to prevent some parties from acquiring a better reputation as supporters of the reform. At a more general level, the argument applies to situations where several agents, whose types are private information have each to take an action while the principal observes only the aggregate outcome.

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On the Feasibility of Unpopular Policies under Re‐Election Concerns

Chiu¹

2002

Southern Economic Journal

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A common concern about political decision making is that re‐election concerns compel incumbent politicians to select policies that, although popular among the electorate, are inferior to available, less popular alternatives. Through studying a series of models, 1 find that, as long as politicians differ solely in the utility derived from holding office, there always exists an equilibrium where incumbents with strong re‐election concerns still make efficient policy choices. However, when other aspects of heterogeneity among politicians are present, incumbents with strong re‐election concerns may have the incentive to condition their decisions according to policy popularity. Suppose, for instance, some politicians are dumb in the sense that they are even more ignorant about policy efficacy than the public. To avoid being viewed as dumb, nondumb politicians (especially those with strong reelection concerns) may accept popular but inefficient policies or reject unpopular but efficient policies.

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Political Correctness

Cited by 411 publications

References 19 publications

Strategic Product Pre-Announcements in Markets with Network Effects

Strategic Product Pre-Announcements in Markets with Network Effects

Blame-Game Politics in a Coalition Government

On the Feasibility of Unpopular Policies under Re‐Election Concerns

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