Political Conditionality and Foreign Aid

Abstract

This article argues that a new generation of Political Conditionalities has emerged during the last decade. This requires an expansion of the original definition and research agenda. Beyond the traditional questions of use and effectiveness however, there is also a need to dig deeper into the dynamics surrounding political conditionalities, particularly the bargaining processes and outcomes along the aid chain -from domestic donor politics, donor harmonization fora, policy dialog spaces to the political economy of recipient institutional reform and donor-coping strategies-because they influence the set-up, use, follow-up, purpose, and effectiveness of PCs.

The true art of the tax deal: Evidence on aid flows and bilateral double tax agreements

“…At the moment, little is known about the actual negotiation process as DTAs are still mainly negotiated behind closed doors (e.g., Lang, 2012). Likewise, there is limited information about aid allocation and bargaining processes between donor and recipient countries (e.g., Molenaers, Dellepiane, & Faust, 2015 (11) Ghana (5) Namibia (3) Algeria (8) Guinea (1) Nepal (3) Argentina (10) Guyana (1) Nigeria (2) Armenia (8) India (8) Pakistan (4) Azerbaijan (9) Indonesia (2) Panama (4) Bangladesh (5) Iran (4) Papua New Guinea (3) Belarus (6) Jordan (5) Peru (2) Belize (1) Kazakhstan (7) Philippines (2) Bolivia (5) Kenya (1) Senegal (3) Bosnia and Herzegovina (2) Kiribati (1) Serbia (6) Botswana (3) Kyrgyz Republic (5) South Africa (17) Brazil (1) Lao PDR (1) Syrian Arab Republic (2) China (4) Lebanon (1) Tajikistan (1) Colombia (4) Lesotho (1)...…”

Blockchain technology and the governance of foreign aid

“…In short, recipient governments face commitment problems to use aid only for development purposes. Historical examples of foreign aid propping up brutal dictators abound (Coyne and Ryan, 2009;Bader and Faust, 2014;Molenaers, Dellepiane and Faust, 2015).…”

“…Scholars have examined the various ways in which foreign aid can be made more effective, emphasizing aid allocation modalities in this regard. However, all aid modalities-such as project aid, program aid, and budget support-have tradeoffs in that they address some agency problem but inadvertently create others (Easterly, 2005;Martens, 2005;Knack and Rahman, 2007;Bigsten and Tengstam, 2015;Molenaers, Dellepiane and Faust, 2015). While circumventing recipient governments is considered to be another alternative (Dietrich, 2013), it tends to shift the locus of agency problems to the non-governmental sector.…”

The democracy dilemma. Aid, power-sharing governments, and post-conflict democratization

“…The term political aid conditionalities refers to ''the allocation and use of financial resources to sanction or reward recipients in order to promote democratic governance and human rights'' (Molenaers et al, 2015b: 62). The increasing popularity of political conditionalities emerged from insights in academia and practice that the effectiveness of foreign aid was conditional on the quality of governance in the recipient country (Burnside and Dollar, 2004;Molenaers et al, 2015a). As a result, political conditionality is a widespread practice, particularly among European and North American donors.…”