Political competition and rural welfare: evidence from Pakistan

Kosec, Katrina; Haider, Hamza; Spielman, David J.; Zaidi, Fatima

doi:10.1093/oep/gpy013

Cited by 11 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…There are solid theoretical reasons to think that greater competition in a political system leads to more responsive government, more and higher quality public goods, and pro-growth economic policies (Besley, Persson and Sturm 2010, Faguet 2012, Kosec et al 2018, Stasavage 2005, which in turn will be reflected in higher taxes and spending. While there is no one commonly accepted measure of political competition, many of the variables scholars have used combine measures of turnout with the closeness of electoral results.…”

Section: Patron and Clients In Action?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The perversion of public land distribution by landed elites: Power, inequality and development in Colombia

2020

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Section: Patron and Clients In Action?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The perversion of public land distribution by landed elites: Power, inequality and development in Colombia

2020

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“…There are solid theoretical reasons to think that greater competition in a political system leads to more responsive government, more and higher quality public goods, and progrowth economic policies (Besley, Persson and Sturm 2010, Faguet 2012, Kosec et al 2018, Stasavage 2005. While there is no one commonly accepted measure of political competition, many of the variables scholars have used combine measures of turnout with the closeness of Jean- Paul Faguet, Fabio Sánchez & Marta-Juanita Villaveces Universidad Nacional de Colombia Sede Bogotá -Facultad de Ciencias Económicas Página electoral results.…”

Section: Patron and Clients In Actionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Perversion of Land Reform by Landed Elites: Power, Inequality and Development in Colombia

2018

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Over two centuries, Colombia transferred vast quantities of land, equivalent to the entire UK landmass, mainly to landless peasants. And yet Colombia retains one of the highest concentrations of land ownership in the world. Why? We show that land reform's effects are highly bimodal. Most of Colombia's 1100+ municipalities lack a landed elite. Here, rural properties grew larger, land inequality fell, and development improved. But where land is concentrated in the hands of a rural elite, distributed land was diverted to bigger farms, resulting in fewer small and more large farms, greater land dispersion, and lower levels of development. We show that these effects -positive and negative -flow through political participation, competition, and policy-making. Landed elites use patron-client ties to distort local and national politics to their benefit. Land reform's secondary effects, on the distribution of power, are more important than its primary effects on the distribution of land.

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“…However, when discussing the relationship between political competition and public goods provision, three relationship models often appear. Some scholars claim that the relationship between political competition and public goods provision is positive (Auerbach, 2016;Costa-I-Font et al, 2003;Crost and Kambhampati, 2010;Habyarimana et al, 2007;Hecock, 2006;Kosec et al, 2018;Rosenzweig, 2015;Arvate, 2013;Zhang et al, 2004;Chhibber and Nooruddin, 2004). For example, Auerbach (2016) showed that the density of party networks is important for public goods provision in a community in India, while others believe that the level of electoral competition at the macrolevel is closely related to the public goods provision of a country (Costa-I-Font et al, 2003;Hecock, 2006;Kosec et al, 2018;Rosenzweig, 2015;Boyne et al, 2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

State capacity, political competition and public goods provision: A cross-national comparative study

Shen

2023

Asian Journal of Comparative Politics

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In the research on explaining public goods provision, political competition is usually linked with public goods provision and it is believed that political competition will have a positive or negative impact on public goods provision. However, others suggest that this relationship changes with the influence of other variables. This article which uses data analysis of 165 countries in 2013 to discuss the relationship between state capacity, political competition and public goods provision and its impact on public goods provision. The results show that public goods provision is good when there is only strong state capacity or a high level of political competition, or both. Then, the four cases of Japan, Singapore, Malaysia and Laos are selected to illustrate the mechanism by which the interaction of state capacity and political competition affects public goods provision.

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Political competition and rural welfare: evidence from Pakistan

Cited by 11 publications

References 59 publications

The perversion of public land distribution by landed elites: Power, inequality and development in Colombia

The perversion of public land distribution by landed elites: Power, inequality and development in Colombia

The Perversion of Land Reform by Landed Elites: Power, Inequality and Development in Colombia

State capacity, political competition and public goods provision: A cross-national comparative study

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