Political competition and environmental reporting

Mir, Monir; Chatterjee, Bikram; Taplin, Ross

doi:10.1108/ara-02-2014-0027

Cited by 13 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 53 publications

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“…Meanwhile, Mir et al (2015) reported a positive effect between "political competition" and "environmental reporting." The number of local governments in New Zealand that reported voluntary environmental information increased throughout the financial years of 2006-2007 and 2007-2008, compared to the previous year of 2005-2006. Nevertheless, there was a decline in the number of local authorities providing this data following the 2007-2008 fiscal year.…”

Section: Green Accounting In the Public Sectormentioning

confidence: 99%

Environmental accounting in public sector: systematic literature review

Rahmawati,

Nazaruddin,

Widiastuti

et al. 2024

JAI

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Research aims: The literature on Environmental Accounting (EA) in the public sector is scarce, unlike in the private sector. Hence, this study aims to ascertain the trajectory of EA research in the public sector and extract insights from prior research on EA in the public sector.Design/Methodology/Approach: The research process was conducted in several stages following Anggraini et al. (2022) and Poje et al. (2022) with several modifications. The keywords were used to discover the articles relating to the topic, namely: “Environmental Reporting,” “Environmental Management,” or “Environmental Accounting,” “Green Accounting,” and “Public Sector”. The study employed an extended period, namely papers published in 2010-2023 in the database Scopus.com. Based on the specified criteria, the final paper that could be analyzed was 69 out of 112 articles.Research findings: Using VOS-viewer, 15 items of keyword themes were discovered. Then, the 15 items were classified into three clusters: Green Accounting, Environmental Regulation, and Sustainable Development Goals in the Public Sector. Theoretical contribution/Originality: The authors are unaware of any existing literature review research on EA, specifically in the public sector, even though it arises from environmental management accounting in the public sector. This study also demonstrates the inferences that can be derived.

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Section: Green Accounting In the Public Sectormentioning

confidence: 99%

Environmental accounting in public sector: systematic literature review

Rahmawati,

Nazaruddin,

Widiastuti

et al. 2024

JAI

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“…Voters as principals hold an interest in their self-economic welfare, so they have incentives to monitor agents' actions because the wealth of voters depends on the actions of agents (Zimmerman, 1977). García-Sánchez et al (2013) and Mir et al (2015) studied the determinants of voluntary reporting by local government using the agency theory approach. Their study revealed that local governments with high political competition disclosed more information about social and environmental information voluntarily.…”

Section: Literature Review and Hypothesis Development Agency Theory A...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Nevertheless, research on the determinants of disclosure in local government mainly focuses on political competition and local government characteristics (Bolívar et al, 2013;García-Sánchez et al, 2013;Laswad et al, 2005;Mir et al, 2015;Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez, 2010). García & García-García (2010) and Mir et al (2015) found that political competition leads to greater disclosure in local government to satisfy principals. Higher political competition encourages mayors in local government to report more information since their re-election victory depends on voters' decisions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Higher political competition encourages mayors in local government to report more information since their re-election victory depends on voters' decisions. Higher debt (Mir et al, 2015), government size (García and García-García, 2010), and government dependency (Feriyanti et al, 2016) have been proven as predictors of financial report disclosure.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Incumbents’ re-election incentives and financial report disclosure in Indonesian local government

Yuliati,

Hidayat,

Raharjo

2023

SMBR

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<p>This study investigates the relationship between incumbents' re-election incentives and financial reporting disclosure in the Indonesian local government. This study uses a sample of 351 local governments at the city or district level throughout 2015-2017 when they ran a local election. Content analysis is used to assign scores to the extent of disclosure. The incumbent mayor or regent who runs a second election is signaled by 1 and 0 otherwise as the proxy for the incumbent's re-election incentives. Cross-sectional multiple regressions will be conducted to examine the hypothesis that there is a significant relationship between an incumbent's re-election incentives and disclosure of financial statements in the local government. Our findings show that incumbent re-election incentives do not have a relationship with the disclosure of financial reports. The incumbent incentive to be re-elected does not necessarily drive an incumbent to disclose its financial statements. Regarding the control variables, significant negative relationships exist between dependencies and the size of the local government towards disclosure level. However, the complexity of the population was positively related to the disclosure level of financial reports. On the contrary, political competition, debt ratio, and type of local government were not related to the disclosure level of the local government's financial reports.</p>

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“…Qiu and Yang [18] believed that the government plays an important coordinating role in environmental protection, and the implementation of the emission permit trading system is conducive for compensating the environmental protection costs of upstream companies and can promote the realization of Pareto optimal. Mir et al [19] studied the relationship between government competition and environmental information disclosure in New Zealand, and the results showed that intensified political competition is conducive for increasing environmental information disclosure. rough the analysis of data from 29 provinces and cities in China, Li and He [20] studied the interaction between regional competition, environmental taxes, and green technology innovation.…”

Section: E Government's Role In the Environmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Tripartite Game Analysis of Environmental Pollution Control Based on Complicated Intergovernmental Relations

Yao²,

Zhang

2021

Complexity

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An excellent ecological environment is conducive for improving economic benefits and social benefits. The environmental pollution control requires the cooperation of governments at all levels and a large amount of capital investment. However, under the system with Chinese characteristics, the intergovernmental relations present complex and dynamic characteristics: the central government is authoritative, the local governments are obedient and self-interested, and the environmental pollution control usually involves multiple government departments, while it has strong externality, which makes it easy to breed “free rider” behavior in the process of environmental pollution control. Therefore, the cross-regional environmental pollution control cooperation model of governments at all levels is a complex and worthwhile research problem. Based on this, the paper studies a tripartite game problem of environmental pollution control from both horizontal and vertical intergovernmental relations. The Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation was used to obtain the optimal effort strategy, environmental pollution control level, and environmental pollution losses under the Nash game model, the Stackelberg game model, and the Cooperative game model. The results show the following: firstly, the governments’ environmental pollution control efforts are positively related to their own execution ability and influence ability and negatively related to the cost coefficient; secondly, from the perspectives of environmental pollution control level and environmental pollution losses, the Cooperative game model is superior to the Nash game model and the Stackelberg game; thirdly, this paper analyzes the relationship between the loss-bearing ratio, the special financial funds, the effort level of government, and the environmental pollution control level; finally, the conclusions are verified by numerical analysis, which proves the validity of the models.

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Political competition and environmental reporting

Cited by 13 publications

References 53 publications

Environmental accounting in public sector: systematic literature review

Environmental accounting in public sector: systematic literature review

Incumbents’ re-election incentives and financial report disclosure in Indonesian local government

A Tripartite Game Analysis of Environmental Pollution Control Based on Complicated Intergovernmental Relations

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