Political clientelism in Thai provinces

Abstract

This article tests hypotheses of the clientelist theory of political participation using both individual level cross sectional survey data and aggregate level data from all 76 provinces in Thailand for the 1996, 2001 and the 2005 General Election timeframes. According to the clientelist theory of political participation, we would expect higher participation among those with fewer resources when there is an incentive for a patron to buy participation, and lower participation where there is no incentive. I use linear and logistical regression to test hypotheses derived from this theory and find there is support enough to suggest clientelism as a cause of political participation during the democratic period of Thailand. The results have important implications for understanding clientelism, regime legitimacy and the prospects for a return to democracy.

More than users: How political parties shape the acceptance of electoral clientelism

“…Because of their lack of experience and knowledge about political processes, the youth is more prone to have an idealistic idea about democracy and thus reject clientelistic practices. Adults are more likely to participate in clientelism as they are aware about the fact that clientelism is part of many electoral campaigns (Owen, 2016).…”

Determinants of political participation in Thailand: An analysis of survey data (2002–2014)

“…These politically attitudinal differences can mostly be explained by differences in the socioeconomic backgrounds among groups of citizens, in particular, the poor and less-educated rural and those at the higher socioeconomic urban status (Bunbongkarn, 1996). The rough picture is that the former group is more likely than the latter to participate in political activity because they are mobilized to engage in politics by nondemocratic actors or mechanisms (i.e., opinion leaders, vote-buying, and patron-client relations) (Bowie, 2008;Ockey, 2000;Owen, 2009Owen, , 2013Owen, , 2016Pasuk et al, 2000).…”