Political Bargaining: Theory, Practice and Process

Political entrepreneurs and electoral capital: the case of the Israeli State Economy Arrangement Law

“…This solution is defined in this article as ''electoral capital'' that politicians may use to help them get re-elected. In this article I define a political entrepreneur as a person or a group that tries to change the political reality by a making policy change or by changing the existing political rules of the game (Christopoulos 2006;Doron and Sened 2001). These political entrepreneurs identify the need (belief) to change the political rules and determine the benefits they will derive from the change.…”

“…Current literature distinguishes little between types of political entrepreneurs. For example, Doron and Sened refer to 'political entrepreneurs' as individuals players in the positive model of polity who serve as middleman between rulers and those they rule(Doron and Sened 2001). This definition applies to two types of entrepreneurs: the inside player (politicians or bureaucrats) and the outside player, known also as social activists or lobbyists (See alsoChristopoulos 2006;López 2002).…”

The Supreme Court as a Political Entrepreneur: The Case of Israela

“…Some political entrepreneurship studies (Dahl 1961;Salisbury 1969;Schumpeter 1942) address the emergence of political entrepreneurs, while others (e.g., Schneider and Teske 1992) deal with the effect that political entrepreneurs have on policy design. Another view emphasizes the strategies and actions undertaken by political entrepreneurs in order to promote formal institutional change (Doron and Sened 2001;Kingdon 1995). Utilizing these approaches, political entrepreneurs affect the process of institutional design.…”

What Rationality Assumption? or, How ‘Positive Political Theory’ Rests on a Mistake

“…Indeed one of the most lively debates in the social sciences is the role of rationality and intentionality as a predictor of behavior (McCarty and Meirowitz, 2007, p. 6).Recall the two basic assumptions of game theory: rationality (utility maximization) and common knowledge (Gates and Humes, 1997, p. 12n).The rationality assumption has been used most extensively and has seen its fullest flowering in economics. But there is nothing distinctly economic about rational behavior, as we shall see (Shepsle and Bonchek, 1997, p. 15).Perhaps the most serious intellectual threat to the rational choice approach comes from empirical findings that challenge the rationality assumption (Lohmann, 1995, p. 128).Of course, this challenge to rational choice theories only makes sense if individual theoretical statements, such as the rational actor assumption, can be tested in a meaningful sense (Diermeier, 1995, p. 62).Rational choice theory is based on two central assumptions: methodological individualism and purposeful action ... Purposeful action requires further clarification because it lies at the heart of the rationality assumption on which this entire research program is founded (Doron and Sened, 2001, pp. 20–1).…”

“…Rational choice theory is based on two central assumptions: methodological individualism and purposeful action ... Purposeful action requires further clarification because it lies at the heart of the rationality assumption on which this entire research program is founded (Doron and Sened, 2001, pp. 20-1).…”