Political Authority, Moral Powers and the Intrinsic Value of Obedience

Coordination Cannot Establish Political Authority

“…If A changes B's normative profile, and this change is the result of exercising a moral power, then A would succeed in effecting the relevant normative change even if this change would not achieve, or would be inefficient in achieving, its intended goal (Cf. Edmundson , 182–3).…”

“… I follow a broad stream of literature here, as the obedience‐focussed analysis of authority has rapidly given way to the power‐focussed analysis. See Edmundson ; Enoch ; Marmor ; Perry and 2012. As Stephen Perry has emphasised, claims that authority should be classified as a power were present in previous literature as well (e.g., MacCormick and Raz ), though in practice these authors slipped into an obedience‐focussed approach to authority.…”

“… The same distinction is made by other authors under different labels. Edmundson (), following Estlund (, 143), distinguishes a moral power from a mere side‐effect power. Van der Vossen () contrasts duty‐creation with duty‐alteration and duty‐activation.…”

Authority and Reason‐Giving1

“…6 6 Edmundson (2010) draws a distinction very similar to mine between merely triggering and robust reason‐giving, using (following Estlund) the terminology of side‐effect power and really exercising a moral power, respectively. I don’t think this terminology is helpful—as some of the examples below show, triggering reason‐giving may be intended, and so not a mere side‐effect, and there’s nothing less than fully real about the normative power to trigger reasons.…”

“…47 47 I am not at all sure I understand Edmundson’s (2010) discussion of authority as intrinsically valuable and giving rise to intrinsic reasons to obey. To the extent that I do, though, let me note that I would respond to it in a way analogous to the point in the text here—authority is never intrinsically of value. …”