Political Ambition and Legislative Behavior in the European Parliament

Abstract

Members of the European Parliament (MEP) typically follow one of two career paths, either advancing within the European Parliament itself or returning to higher office in their home states. We argue that these different ambitions condition legislative behavior. Specifically, MEPs seeking domestic careers defect from group-leadership votes more frequently and oppose legislation that expands the purview of supranational institutions. We show how individual, domestic-party, and national level variables shape the careers available to MEPs and, in turn, their voting choices. To test the argument, we analyze MEPs' roll-call voting behavior in the 5th session of the EP (1999EP ( -2004 using a random effects model that captures idiosyncrasies in voting behavior across both individual MEPs and specific roll-call votes. * We thank Brian Gaines, Jude Hays, Robert Pahre, Kevin Quinn, Tom Rudolph, and Guy Whitten for helpful assistance. We also acknowledge the funding support of the European Union Center at the University of Illinois.1 Politicians are ambitious. Some legislators wish to remain in their current positions for multiple terms, others aspire to other offices, and still others expect to serve in politics for only a short time (Schlesinger 1966). Those career ambitions shape behavior. A legislator's expectations about future office affect the choices she makes while serving in her current position (Hibbing 1986). Demonstrating empirical support for the importance of political ambition, however, is not straightforward. While research has focused on behavior across legislatures with a variety of career ladders (see e.g. Black 1972, Rhode 1979, Epstein, Brady, Kawato & O'Halloran 1997, Samuels 2003, those studies center on a single country, limiting the possible variation in career-oriented behavior. Since only a small number of other positions are likely to arouse the ambitions of serving legislators, it is difficult to disentangle how the characteristics of the legislature, its members, and the opportunity structure interact to influence legislative behavior. 1We take advantage of a unique institutional laboratory to investigate how ambition affects vote choice: the European Parliament (EP). The EP houses politicians from all member states of the European Union (EU), each with a different set of national political institutions, party systems, and political opportunity structures. Members of the European Parliament (MEP) typically follow one of two career paths (Stolz 2001, Scarrow 1997. Some MEPs prefer to advance within the EP itself, gaining seniority and access to key leadership positions.Other MEPs view their time in the EP as a valuable stepping-stone to higher office in their home state. We argue that these different career ambitions condition legislative behavior within the EP. Those MEPs seeking to remain in the EP further their careers by pleasing EP group leaders and will work to expand the authority of Europe's supranational institutions relative to member-state governments. MEPs expecting to retu...

Striving for influence

“…An MEP's loyalty to the national party is higher when parties are gatekeepers to reelection (Hix, 2004), as well as among those who are expected to run for office on the national level (Meserve, Pemstein, and Bernhard, 2009). A recent study further shows that participation levels increase with an MEP's intention to seek reelection (Høyland, Hobolt, and Hix, 2013 (Scarrow, 1997).…”

“…The EP is sometimes used as a final retreat from national elected office, a place to parachute in case of electoral defeat, or by national politicians who want to get rid of competitors. The EP may also be used as an arena in which young politicians can gain political experience before they "graduate" to the national level (Meserve et al, 2009). It therefore makes sense to model renomination to the European Parliament within a framework robust to limited career spans, and to emphasize implications of the risks of adverse selection.…”

Tenure, turnover and careers in the European Parliament: MEPs as policy-seekers

“…Addressing a slightly different question, Meserve et al (2009) use Schlesinger's (1966 concepts of progressive and static ambition to understand MEPs' defection from their party group line. Progressive ambition describes a desire to further one's career beyond the legislature in a more senior political office.…”

Policy positioning in the European Parliament

“…Unlike the national political parties that they comprise, however, EP party groups consist not of legislators elected directly as party group members, but rather of collections of affiliated MEPs elected as members of distinct national parties. The resulting need for MEPs to answer to both national-level and EPlevel principals gives rise to a dual agent problem, and the associated difficulties of maintaining discipline and cohesion within the party groups have been subject to recent study (Hix, Noury and Roland 2007;Meserve et al 2009;Raunio 1997;McElroy and Benoit 2010). The difficulty in maintaining cohesion is further exacerbated by the very dynamic nature of party competition in the 27 member states where parties enter and exit the political arena in response to changing national conditions.…”