Policymaking by the Executive: Examining the Fate of Presidential Agenda Items

Byers, Jason S.; Carson, Jamie L.; Williamson, Ryan D.

doi:10.1080/07343469.2019.1631905

Cited by 10 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 63 publications

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“…The second key covariate is Policy Priority Agency which is simply a binary indicator whether a policy issue is mentioned by a president in the State of the Union Address (SOTUA), Joint Session of Congress (first year presidents from Reagan onward), and President Jimmy Carter's Democratic Nomination Convention acceptance speech in 1976 (for 1977) that is directly relevant to the (sub)agency in question for a given appointee in their nomination year. 8 These addresses constitute a president's formal policy agenda containing information on presidential policy priorities reflected in their budgetary and legislative programs (e.g., Byers, Carson, and Williamson 2020;Baumgartner and Jones 2009;Cohen 1995;Eshbaugh-Soha 2005, 2017. Support for the incentive compatibility hypothesis is observed when the interaction between Presidential Loyalty × Policy Priority Agency exhibits a smaller hazard rate (i.e., negative coefficient/hazard ratio <1.0) relative to the relationship between loyalty and tenure when an agency is not a policy priority in the year a nomination (Presidential Loyalty).…”

Section: Evaluating Incentive Compatibility Between Presidents and Ag...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Proponents, Caretakers, and the Dynamics of Administrative Leadership Turnover in U.S. Executive Agencies

Krause

Byers

2023

Political Research Quarterly

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Administrative leader turnover adversely affects the organizational stability of U.S. federal executive agencies, as well as undermines presidents’ policy goals. An incentive compatibility theory of administrative leader turnover is proposed that distinguishes between proponent (policy priority) versus caretaker (non-policy priority) loyalist executive appointees. This theory predicts that the proponents’ tenure will be comparatively more stable since it reflects incentive compatibility for both the president and executive appointee compared to caretakers where such a relationship is lacking. The evidence comports with this logic by demonstrating that appointee loyalty results in a longer tenure in office when their agency constitutes a stated policy priority for the president at the time of agreed upon service compared to when this happens not to be the case. Responsive competence in executive administration requires incentive compatibility that benefits both the president and executive appointees for ensuring stable leadership of U.S. federal agencies.

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Section: Evaluating Incentive Compatibility Between Presidents and Ag...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Proponents, Caretakers, and the Dynamics of Administrative Leadership Turnover in U.S. Executive Agencies

Krause

Byers

2023

Political Research Quarterly

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“…While previous research studies the president's choice to issue executive orders rather than pursue their objectives via the legislative process (Belco and Rottinghaus 2014;Byers, Carson, and Williamson 2020), little scholarship evaluates what we refer to as directive substitution. 3 However, other research documents how presidents substitute one action for another in other contexts.…”

Section: Mechanisms Of Presidential Policymakingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Divided Government, Strategic Substitution, and Presidential Unilateralism

Kaufman,

Rogowski

2023

American J Political Sci

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Presidents select from a range of instruments when creating new policies through executive action. We study strategic substitution in this context and argue that presidents use less visible means of unilateral instruments when Congress is likely to scrutinize presidential action. Using data on unilateral orders issued between 1946 and 2020, we report two main findings. First, analyzing presidents’ choice of instruments, we show that presidents are more likely to substitute memoranda and other less visible instruments for executive orders and proclamations during periods of divided government. Second, after accounting for the substitution of executive orders with other instruments, we find that presidents issue greater numbers of directives during divided government than during unified government. These findings provide new evidence about the limitations of the separation of powers as a constraint on presidential unilateralism and highlight the importance of accounting for the variety of instruments through which presidents create unilateral policies.

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“…In some countries, presidents might choose between sending bills to the legislature or ruling by decree (Palanza 2018; Saiegh 2011). In the US, presidents use a combination of legislative and non‐legislative tools (like executive orders) to advance their policy agenda (Byers, Carson, and Williamson 2020)—but the passage of bills remains the main indicator of success of the president’s agenda. Other institutional design features, like the agenda‐setting power, have also been found to affect the success of the president’s legislative priorities (Romer and Rosenthal 1978).…”

Section: Determinants Of the Success Of The President’s Legislative A...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The policy area of a presidential bill has also been found to impact its legislative success (Byers, Carson, and Williamson 2020). As they are required to bargain to attract the support of the median voter in the legislature (Saiegh 2011), presidents make proposals that have broader appeal (Barrett and Eshbaugh‐Soha 2007)—that is, that are more consensual.…”

Section: Determinants Of the Success Of The President’s Legislative A...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Changes in the Rules of the Lawmaking Process and the Success of Presidential Bills: Chile, 1990–2018

Mimica

Navia

Osorio

2022

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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this article assesses the effect of changes in the lawmaking process on the success of the president's legislative agenda, distinguishing between within-term success (bills that passed during the term) and overall success (including bills that passed after the president left office). With the 2064 presidential bills introduced in seven terms in Chile's presidential system, we assess the impact of changes in lawmaking rules on within-term (59.9%) and overall success (70.6%). Changes that decrease attributions of the president and create more opportunities for executive-legislative bargaining-including concurrent elections-increase the chances of success of presidential bills. the use of presidential urgency motions, an agenda-setting tool, makes bills more likely to pass, but the issuance of many urgency motions undermines the bill's chances to succeed. Presidential bills introduced early in the term and those on issues where there is more policy convergence are more likely to pass.as the devil is in the details, the success of the president's legislative agenda should be impacted by changes in the rules of the lawmaking process. in countries where legislative rules rarely change, differences in how presidents use their toolbox of legislative powers explain legislative success. thus, "differences in uncertainty, not partisan support, drive the variations in chief executives' ability to enact policy changes through statute law" (saiegh 2011, 11). in turn, in places where legislative rules change all the time, the effect of specific changes is difficult to isolate. But in countries with more stable institutional design and party system, seemingly minor changes in lawmaking rules might impact the success of the

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Policymaking by the Executive: Examining the Fate of Presidential Agenda Items

Cited by 10 publications

References 63 publications

Proponents, Caretakers, and the Dynamics of Administrative Leadership Turnover in U.S. Executive Agencies

Proponents, Caretakers, and the Dynamics of Administrative Leadership Turnover in U.S. Executive Agencies

Divided Government, Strategic Substitution, and Presidential Unilateralism

Changes in the Rules of the Lawmaking Process and the Success of Presidential Bills: Chile, 1990–2018

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