Policy voting in U.S. House primaries

Bawn, Kathleen; DeMora, Stephanie L.; Dowdle, Andrew; Hall, Spencer; Myers, Mark E.; Patterson, S. Howard; Zaller, John

doi:10.1080/17457289.2019.1669611

Cited by 4 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…Moreover, while previous work has found “little evidence of united fronts” (Bawn et al. 2015, 2), this article shows that party elites’ coordination varies significantly across primaries and that as the party's advantage in the district increases, party elites are less coordinated in their efforts in the primary. When districts are competitive, party elites are more likely to forgo their own preferences to help nominate a candidate perceived as having the best chance of winning the general election.…”

contrasting

confidence: 54%

“…Work focusing on party coordination in a smaller subset of primary elections found “little evidence of united fronts, or efforts to form them…and many nominations remain free‐for‐alls” (Bawn et al. 2015, 2).…”

Section: Theoretical Party Objectives In Electionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Previous attempts by scholars to form arguments about party engagement in primary elections (and subsequently, the relative priorities of party elites and their influence on the primary process) have largely focused on party behavior in a small subset of primaries—usually open seat primaries in districts that are competitive or favor a particular party (Bawn et al. 2014; 2015; 2019; Dominguez 2011; Ocampo 2018). In contrast, we know little beyond anecdotal accounts about the behavior of elites in either unwinnable districts or challenger primaries.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Party Elite Engagement and Coordination in House Primary Elections: A Test of Theories of Parties

Hassell

2021

American J Political Sci

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The support of party elites in the primary has a strong influence on who runs in a primary and how well they do. Yet party elites do not always engage or coordinate their efforts. Moreover, theories of parties disagree about whether and where party elites should engage and coordinate in primaries, depending on their view of the relative importance of electoral and policy goals. This article examines party elites’ engagement and coordination in primary elections in the U.S. House between 2004 and 2018. Consistent with theories of parties as networks of policy demanders, party elites are engaged in primaries in both competitive and safe districts. But, while party elites coordinate their efforts in competitive districts, they are less likely to coordinate in safe districts. Their disparate coordination efforts reflect different electoral priorities in these districts.

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contrasting

confidence: 54%

Section: Theoretical Party Objectives In Electionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Party Elite Engagement and Coordination in House Primary Elections: A Test of Theories of Parties

Hassell

2021

American J Political Sci

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“…The final piece goes the other way. Bawn et al (2019) are exploring congressional primary elections in the United States. These intraparty contests are usually multi-candidate, and so they draw on research on voters who face multi-party contests.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bridging American and comparative research on political parties

Noel

2019

Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties

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We need a better bridge between the comparative study of political parties and the study of parties in the United States. The articles in this issue of JEPOP represent an attempt to build such a bridge. They were all originally presented at a March 2018 conference that brought convened more than 20 scholars to present and discuss 15 papers over two days in the hills above Florence, Italy. The fault for a lack of communication lies mostly with Americanist scholars such as myself. Too often, scholarship on American political parties not only ignores other countries, it is ignorant of the findings from scholarship outside the United States. Recent theoretical developments on political parties in the United States (e.g. Aldrich 1995; Bawn et al. 2012; Schlozman and Rosenfeld 2019) are not only not tested on other cases, they are not always developed in a way that could be. In the area of theory, the United States runs a trade surplus, as more comparative work draws on theories developed on the United States than the other way around. But American scholars could do better at developing theories with an eye to other cases. Meanwhile, however, much comparative work also omits the United States. This is understandable. The United States is an unusual democracy. It is the only developed democracy with a presidential system and single-member districts and only two major parties. U.S. parties use primary elections in a way that makes them far more open to outsiders. The regulation of the media and campaign finance in the United States is far less than in most systems. The end result is a democracy that looks very different from the rest in the world. Not surprisingly, then, sensible research strategies often isolate the U.S. case. Comparative scholars focus on parliamentary systems, or democracies in a particular region, or some other set of cases that, while coherently defined, happens not to include the United States. Americanist scholars are content to explore their one very unusual case. This sort of narrowing of

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