Policy Preference Formation and Subsystem Behaviour: The Case of Commercial Bank Regulation

Bureaucratic Competition in the Policy Process

“…Carpenter (2000, 2001) provides evidence that bureaucratic actors can manipulate coalition membership to produce more desirable policy outcomes. Even more germane to this investigation is Krause's (1997) assertion that agencies strategically shift short‐term goals and expressed preferences when seeking advantage over other subsystem participants. Thus, though the ACF dismisses short‐term variation in coalition membership as unimportant when considering the overall impact on policy (Sabatier & Jenkins‐Smith, 1999), there is reason to believe that individual agencies may be able to gain strategic advantage by shifting coalitions temporarily.…”

“…Only very recently have some scholars begun to point out this neglected feature of subsystems and argue that an understanding of bureaucratic strategy is key to an accurate portrayal of policymaking. Krause (1997) demonstrates that bureaucracies strategically adjust their policy demands in response to the actions other actors to remain viable players in the subsystem. In an illustration of a different type of strategic behavior, Carpenter (2000, 2001) suggests that bureaus can create more autonomy for themselves and change the composition of subsystems by actively creating “coalitions of esteem” among interested groups.…”

Persistent Leadership: Presidents and the Evolution of U.S. Financial Reform, 1970‐2007

“…That focus, by nature, does not lend itself to an understanding of the life course of new policy initiatives. For example, in a fine article, Krause (1997) did not incorporate any measures of presidential behavior because the president did not play a “ regular role” (emphasis in original) throughout the sample period in bank regulation (533n27). Krause cited Meier (1985) to the effect that in financial regulation, presidents “only play a significant role in exceptional situations” (76) and their involvement is “extremely sporadic” (Krause 1997, 533n27).…”

“…Woolley (1993) examines a single issue—the so‐called nonbank banks—in light of the congressional dominance theory. But like Krause (1997), his analysis also does not consider the president at all.…”