Policy factors explaining the failure of delegated management in water supply: evidence from Ghana

Mvulirwenande, Silas; Wehn, Uta; Alaerts, Guy J.

doi:10.1080/02508060.2018.1539697

Cited by 7 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…Even the World Bank projects, the annual evaluation, and the Transaction Advisors reports were shrouded in secrecy by the agent (the government) (Zaato, 2014). Mvulirwenande et al (2019) argue that there were ineffective dialogue and communication between the principal (citizens) and the agent (government), especially during the contractual agreement. This contract was decided by a group of technocrats, with limited consultations or participation in the decision-making process (Mvulirwenande et al 2019;Zaato, 2011).…”

Section: Implication For Policy and Accountabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Mvulirwenande et al (2019) argue that there were ineffective dialogue and communication between the principal (citizens) and the agent (government), especially during the contractual agreement. This contract was decided by a group of technocrats, with limited consultations or participation in the decision-making process (Mvulirwenande et al 2019;Zaato, 2011). Mvulirwenande et al (2019) observe that the contract was initiated at the blind side of the principal, which led to subsequent public resistance.…”

Section: Implication For Policy and Accountabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This contract was decided by a group of technocrats, with limited consultations or participation in the decision-making process (Mvulirwenande et al 2019;Zaato, 2011). Mvulirwenande et al (2019) observe that the contract was initiated at the blind side of the principal, which led to subsequent public resistance. The massive public agitations and demonstrations against the management contract between AVRL and GWCL can be attributed to the lack of democratic accountability and monopoly that characterized the water sector reform process in Ghana (Fuest & Haffner, 2007;Ainuson, 2010;Zaato, 2011).…”

Section: Implication For Policy and Accountabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The massive public agitations and demonstrations against the management contract between AVRL and GWCL can be attributed to the lack of democratic accountability and monopoly that characterized the water sector reform process in Ghana (Fuest & Haffner, 2007;Ainuson, 2010;Zaato, 2011). Most civil society organizations vigorously opposed the management contract (notably through public protests) and were very unwilling to cooperate Journal of Public Administration and Governance ISSN 2161-7104 2019 with AVRL (Mvulirwenande et al 2019;Fuest & Haffner, 2007). For instance, the National Coalition Against Privatization (NCAP), the Integrated Social Development Centre (ISODEC), and the Trade Union Congress (TUC) decried what it saw as lack of transparency in the decision-making concerning water privatization (Whitfield, 2006).…”

Section: Implication For Policy and Accountabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In part, these problems were the effects of the misunderstanding between GWCL and the World Bank. Mvulirwenande et al (2019) observes that GWCL remained unresponsive to the grievances of the private operator which emanates from the contract implementation. The terms and conditions of the contract vaguely described the relationship between GWCL and AVRL.…”

Section: Implication For Policy and Accountabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Anatomy of the Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in Ghana: Implication for Policy and Accountability

Danso

2019

JPAG

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With the administrative and operational functions of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) becoming increasingly complex and sophisticated among developing countries by the 1980s, privatization was recommended by the IMF/World Bank as a remedy to these institutional deficiencies . This is contingent on the neoclassical debate that private ownership rather than public ownership of management and operations of SOEs results in prudent policy process and accountability. Therefore, this study sought to assess the validity of this assertion by employing the Principal-Agent theory in assessing the level of accountability between the citizens (principal) and the government (agent) during private ownership of service delivery. As a qualitative study, this paper adopts unobtrusive content analysis of an empirical study of the privatization of Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL). The government (agent) under the Principal-Agent theory is to ensure that the private operator, Aqua Vitens Rand Limited (AVRL) respects the terms of divestiture, while upholding the principles of accountability. However, the findings of the study suggest that the failure of government (agent) to uphold core accountability mechanisms such as transparency, accessibility to information, sense of ownership, responsiveness, and conformity to established monitoring and evaluation measures, contributed to the inability to achieve key performance targets, leading to the unsuccessful policy outcome of the privatization contract. This paper, therefore, argues that the failure to adopt accountability mechanisms in the divestiture of SOEs will inevitably compromise administrative policy outcomes.

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Section: Implication For Policy and Accountabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%