Policy Change and Industry Associability: The Australian Mining Sector

Kellow, Aynsley; Simms, Marian

doi:10.1111/1467-8500.12008

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 28 publications

(25 reference statements)

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“…Yet, various prominent organisations are still headquartered in other states, such as the ACTU, BCA, and ACF (Warhurst : 263). Curiously, relations between state and national associations have been largely unexplored, as has the way they evolved as the nature of Australian federalism has changed (Kellow and Simms : 43). On the latter point, we can see some evidence of change.…”

Section: The Composition and Diversity Of The Australian Interest Gromentioning

confidence: 99%

Assessing the Composition and Diversity of the Australian Interest Group System

Fraussen

Halpin

2016

Aust J Public Adm

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Any democratic society requires mechanisms for citizens to have effective political voice. Clearly, political parties provide a key channel for expressing views and preferences. However, organised interests provide another important mechanism for such representation. A crucial question in this regard is whether the interest group system is capable of ensuring the representation of a variety of public and private interests. Resolving these debates requires data that map the terrain and also are attentive to organisational diversity. This article takes up this challenge through exploring the composition and diversity of the Australian system of organised interests, using a new data set based on the Directory of Australian Associations. This system-level approach delivers important insights into the nature of the Australian interest group system, as well as provides a framework for subsequent work interpreting and contextualising advocacy activities of particular groups, or lobbying dynamics in specific policy domains.

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Section: The Composition and Diversity Of The Australian Interest Gromentioning

confidence: 99%

Assessing the Composition and Diversity of the Australian Interest Group System

Fraussen

Halpin

2016

Aust J Public Adm

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“…Companies which believe regulation can be stopped by aggressive conservative partisan political action may do so, while those who see regulation as inevitable might adopt a strategy of engagement with both major parties. A qualitative case study of this, provided by Kellow and Simms (), showed that in the mining industry in Australia there was a marked transformation of the industry's tactics over the decade of the 1990s, moving from an initial position of active hostility to indigenous and environmental legislation to one of support for negotiation and the regulation of the industry. This subtler conceptualization suggests that when faced with hostile legislation, the political action of a corporation does not flow automatically from the structural position of a corporation but rather depends on the subjective judgement of corporations (and their directors) about effective strategy.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Motives of corporate political donations: industry regulation, subjective judgement and the origins of pragmatic and ideological corporations

Harrigan

2017

British Journal of Sociology

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What motivates corporate political action? Are corporations motivated by their own narrow economic self-interest; are they committed to pursuing larger class interests; or are corporations instruments for status groups to pursue their own agendas? Sociologists have been divided over this question for much of the last century. This paper introduces a novel case - that of Australia - and an extensive dataset of over 1,500 corporations and 7,500 directors. The paper attempts to understand the motives of corporate political action by examining patterns of corporate political donations. Using statistical modelling, supported by qualitative evidence, the paper argues that, in the Australian case, corporate political action is largely motivated by the narrow economic self-interest of individual corporations. Firms' interests are, consistent with regulatory environment theory, defined by the nature of government regulation in their industry: those in highly regulated industries (such as banking) and those dependent on government support (such as defence) tend to adopt a strategy of hedging their political support, and make bipartisan donations (to both major parties). In contrast, firms facing hostile regulation (such as timber or mining), and those without strong dependence on state support (such as small companies) tend to adopt a strategy of conservative partisanship, and make conservative-only donations. This paper argues that regulatory environment theory needs to be modified to incorporate greater emphasis on the subjective political judgements of corporations facing hostile regulation: a corporation's adoption of conservative partisanship or hedging is not just a product of the objective regulation they face, but also whether corporate leaders judge such regulation as politically inevitable or something that can be resisted. Such a judgement is highly subjective, introducing a dynamic and unpredictable dimension to corporate political action.

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