Policing following political and social transitions: Russia, Brazil, and China compared

Abstract

This is a comparative analysis of policing in three countries that have experienced a major political or social transition, Russia, Brazil, and China. We consider two related questions: (1) how has transition in each country affected the deployment of the police against regime opponents (which we term "repression")? And (2) how has the transition affected other police misconduct that also victimizes citizens but is not directly ordered by the regime ("abuse")? As expected, authoritarian regimes are more likely to perpetrate severe repression. However, the most repressive authoritarian regimes such as China may also contain oversight institutions that limit police abuse. We also assess the relative importance of both transitional outcomes and processes in posttransition policing evolution, arguing that the "abusiveness" of contemporary Brazilian police reflects the failure to create oversight mechanisms during the transition, and that the increasing "repressiveness" of Chinese police reflects a conscious effort by the Chinese Communist Party to reinforce the police in an era of economic liberalization. In contrast, Russian police are both significantly abusive and repressive, although less systematically "repressive" than Chinese police, and less "abusive" (or at least violent)

Fighting Corruption in Russia: Its Characteristics and Purpose

“…In this respect, some researchers may consider Russia’s political regime to be a complex mixture of democratic and authoritarian elements where democratic tendencies prevail (Holmes, 2005), while others view it as competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way, 2010; Light et al, 2015) or democratic authoritarianism (Webster et al, 2000: xiv–xv). In any case, it is very difficult to deny that modern Russia is characterized by strong centralized power and the concentration of economic and political power in the hands of a very limited group of people.…”

The legacy of military dictatorship: Explaining violent crime in democracies

“…It can lead to a ‘mano dura’ (‘iron fist’) approach to dealing with crime, such that criminals are viewed as regime opponents and enemies (Chevigny, 1999: 49). In Brazil, for example, where the military remains entrenched in the police forces many years after democratization, the police are engaged in an ‘all-out war’ on criminals (Light et al, 2015). Existing research indicates, however, that ‘mano dura’ crime-fighting strategies are ineffective for lowering rates of long-term violent crime (Arias and Ungar, 2009).…”

Challenges to the veracity and the international comparability of Russian homicide statistics

“…As servants of the regime in the Soviet Union, police officers were subject to intensive political indoctrination and the policing itself was highly ideological (Light et al, 2015: 221). Performance evaluation relied heavily on clearance rates (Favarel-Garrigues, 2011: 70), creating incentives to falsify reports.…”

“…Also, the police often aligned themselves with regional politicians and formed ‘politicized financial-industrious groups’ (Hale, 2006: 162–73). Although the ‘centralized politicization’ of the police in the USSR was replaced by ‘decentralized politicization’ (Light et al, 2015: 222), subordination to localized political interests continued to create incentives for the deliberate manipulation of crime data.…”