Police Governance and Accountability in Scotland Following Reform: Revisiting the Policy Rationale for the Creation of the Scottish Police Authority

Abstract

This article critically assesses the policy discourse for police reform in Scotland, specifically focusing on the rationale for the creation of the Scottish Police Authority (SPA). Through a chronological review of official policy reports and consultations that took place prior to the 2012 Act, and by drawing on a select number of interviews 1 conducted as part of the wider study (Malik, 2017a), I argue that while austerity became the catalyst for change, police reform in Scotland was strongly supported by concerns around weak police governance arrangements. The SPA was created to strengthen financial oversight, to provide enhanced focus on national policing requirements and to bring in professional governance competencies and expertise that the local police authorities lacked. In the five years since reform, the SPA has continued to struggle to address these weaknesses. Furthermore, the official reform agenda neglected the need for robust mechanisms for accountability of operational policing. This omission manifested in the most abrasive fashion following the 2012 Act as cases such as stop and search and armed policing highlighted the inadequacies of the new police governance arrangements. In order that the SPA can fulfil its intended purpose, it needs to enhance its capacity and focus on providing holistic mechanisms for police governance that incorporate financial oversight and robust accountability of operational policing.

The strategic state: a case study of devolved government in Scotland

“…Finally, in relation to policing it has been noted that "muddy lines of accountability, a lack of separation between the key actors and an interventionist approach by the Scottish Government has politicized the space in which strategy is developed" (Murray & Malik, 2019, p. 174). Controversies surrounding the establishment of Police Scotland (Thomson et al, 2015), the use of stop and search powers (Murray, 2015), deployment of armed policing, and scrapping of the Edinburgh housebreaking unit (Malik, 2018;Thomson et al, 2015) have all served to highlight the challenges in running a national public service whilst also being sensitive to local context and needs.…”

Local governance in the new Police Scotland: Renegotiating power, recognition and responsiveness

“…Despite local Police Boards having important powers relating, for example, to the formal appointment and dismissal of chief officers, as well as responsibilities to maintain an efficient and effective police service through formally contributing 49% of the police budget, there was little evidence of them actively using their powers, and a growing body of commentary showed they were failing to offer meaningful challenge to the police (Donnelly and Scott, 2002;Laing and Fossey, 2011;Walker, 2000). Some claimed that the Boards were too deferential to Chief Constables (Scott and Wilkie, 2001), in part because they actually lacked the necessary expertise in policing, crime patterns, finance and other relevant organisational matters to competently hold the police to account (Laing and Fossey, 2011: 5-6;Malik, 2018), resulting in a process of governance understood to be 'passive' (Audit Scotland and HMICS, 2012: 6 Scotland and HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, remained largely unchanged; and, s32 of the Act took the opportunity to assert new principles for Scottish policing, its main purpose being stated as 'to improve the safety and well-being of persons, localities and communities', to be advanced through 'working in collaboration with others', being 'engaged with local communities', and working 'to prevent crime, harm and disorder'. In the legislation at least, ideas associated with the local governance of crime (e.g.…”

“…Following the re-election of the SNP, two public consultations on police reform were run, neither producing a definitive result in favour of centralization. Perhaps emboldened by the Christie Commission’s (2011) wider recommendations for public service delivery reform in this direction, opinion in the Scottish government turned around and a single service became the objective (for the definitive account of this process, see Malik, 2018). Police Scotland therefore emerged as a solution to a complex web of issues including: public sector service delivery; public expenditure cuts; national and local police accountability; and a perceived lack of expertise, competence and democratic representation within local police governance arrangements.…”

“…The Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 was passed by the Scottish Parliament in June 2012 and signed into law with Royal Assent in August of the same year. Although the focus of this article is local policing, three features of the new ‘Police Service for Scotland’ (as it is known in the Act, Police Scotland being its corporate identity) are worth noting as necessary background to what follows: tripartism for the new Police Scotland formally moved to the centre, power and responsibility now being distributed between the Chief Constable, the Cabinet Secretary for Justice and a new independent body, the Scottish Police Authority (SPA) (see Malik, 2018); much of the wider architecture of central governance, auditing and inspection, primarily through the offices of the Auditor General, Audit Scotland and HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, remained largely unchanged; and, s32 of the Act took the opportunity to assert new principles for Scottish policing, its main purpose being stated as ‘to improve the safety and well-being of persons, localities and communities’, to be advanced through ‘working in collaboration with others’, being ‘engaged with local communities’, and working ‘to prevent crime, harm and disorder’. In the legislation at least, ideas associated with the local governance of crime (for example, Crawford, 1997) – partnership, engagement, community, prevention – were given explicit expression.…”

Negotiating Boundaries of Tolerance: The Scottish Police Authority and the Doctrine of Operational Independence

“…Nearly a decade since the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 (henceforth, the Reform Act 2012) came into effect, this observation remains true. The Reform Act 2012 replaced the previous and oft-criticised local police boards (Walker 2000;Scott and Wilkie, 2001;Donnelly and Scott, 2002;Tomkins, 2009;Laing and Fossey, 2011;Scott, 2011;Malik, 2017a) with a centralised Scottish Police Authority and amalgamated the eight local police forces into a single Police Scotland. When examining police governance arrangements south of the border, scholars have routinely highlighted the importance of the relationship between the Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) and their chief constables, often placing the effectiveness of the governance arrangements on the ability of the former to be able to navigate the fine lines between the operational independence of the chief constable and legitimate oversight of operational policing (Newburn and Peay, 2012;Lister, 2013;Lister and Rowe, 2014;Wells, 2015;Loveday, 2018a).…”