In this chapter we consider some of the ethical challenges inherent in the regulation of discretionary police power. Discretion is central to police policy and practice, but it also provides a level of freedom that opens up the space for injustice and inequity, and this is seen most vividly in recent debates about unfairness and racial profiling in the distribution and experience police stops in the US and UK. How to regulate discretionary power is a challenging question, and this is especially so in the context of practices like stop-and-search/stop-and-frisk. The ability to stop people in the street and question them is central to policing as it is understood in many liberal democracies, but under conditions of unfairness and questionable efficacy -when the application of this particular police power appears unethical as well as ineffective -one can reasonably ask whether the power should be dropped or curtailed, and if curtailed, how this would work in practice.
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BiographyBen Bradford is Departmental Lecturer in Criminology, Faculty of Law, University of Oxford Jonathan Jackson is Professor of Research Methodology and member of the Mannheim Centre for Criminology at the LSE.
AcknowledgementsJon would also like to thank Yale Law School and Harvard Kennedy School for hosting him during the research leave that allowed him to wrote this chapter; he is also grateful to the UK's Economic and Social Research Council for funding that research leave (grant number ES/L011611/1).