2020
DOI: 10.1017/s0003055420000350
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Polarized Pluralism: Organizational Preferences and Biases in the American Pressure System

Abstract: For decades, critics of pluralism have argued that the American interest group system exhibits a significantly biased distribution of policy preferences. We evaluate this argument by measuring groups’ revealed preferences directly, developing a set of ideal point estimates, IGscores, for over 2,600 interest groups and 950 members of Congress on a common scale. We generate the scores by jointly scaling a large dataset of interest groups’ positions on congressional bills with roll-call votes on those same bills.… Show more

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Cited by 33 publications
(35 citation statements)
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References 64 publications
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“…Interest groups also shape whose opinions become more readily available to legislators (Klüver 2020). There is ample evidence of representational biases in the pressure system (e.g., Binderkrantz et al 2015;Crosson et al 2020). Even in organizations that represent marginalized subconstituencies, the preferences of their most advantaged members tend to prevail.…”
Section: Exposure and Beliefsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Interest groups also shape whose opinions become more readily available to legislators (Klüver 2020). There is ample evidence of representational biases in the pressure system (e.g., Binderkrantz et al 2015;Crosson et al 2020). Even in organizations that represent marginalized subconstituencies, the preferences of their most advantaged members tend to prevail.…”
Section: Exposure and Beliefsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Beginning with the introduction of the wellknown NOMINATE procedure to measure legislator ideology with roll-call votes (Poole and Rosenthal, 1985;Poole, 2005), the literature has since greatly advanced these measurement techniques, expanding them into new areas of theoretical and empirical interest. Methods have been developed to measure the ideology of legislators (Poole and Rosenthal, 1985;Heckman and Snyder Jr., 1997;Clinton, Jackman and Rivers, 2004), political donors (Bonica, 2013(Bonica, , 2014(Bonica, , 2018, interest groups (Groseclose, Levitt and Snyder Jr., 1999;McKay, 2008;Crosson, Furnas and Lorenz, Forthcoming), Supreme and lower-court justices (Martin and Quinn, 2002;Jessee and Malhotra, 2013;Bonica and Woodruff, 2015;Bonica and Sen, 2017), newspapers (Groseclose and Milyo, 2005;Ho and Quinn, 2008;Shapiro, 2010, 2011), municipalities (Tausanovitch and Warshaw, 2014), and government agencies (Richardson, Clinton and Lewis, 2018). Substantial effort has also been put into measuring the ideology of ordinary citizens and political actors on a common ideological scale (Aldrich and McKelvey, 1977;Jessee, 2009;Bafumi and Herron, 2010;Bonica, 2013Bonica, , 2014Jessee and Malhotra, 2013;Hare et al, 2015;Jessee, 2016).…”
Section: Political Ideology Of Social Media Users and News Mediamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Interest groups also shape whose opinions become more readily available to legislators (Klüver 2020). There is ample evidence of representational biases in the pressure system (e.g., Binderkrantz, Christiansen, and Pedersen 2015;Crosson, Furnas, and Lorenz 2020). Even in organizations that represent marginalized subconstituencies, the preferences of their most advantaged members tend to prevail.…”
Section: Exposure and Beliefsmentioning
confidence: 99%