Points of View

Moore, A. W.

doi:10.2307/2220058

Cited by 51 publications

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“…The second (perspectival knowledge 2 ) is knowledge towards a vantage point, namely towards the illusory ideas of reason qua foci imaginarii. This distinction is important to rectify common readings of Kant as endorsing a kind of perspectival/situated knowledge that would seem to make his view slide into transcendental solipsism (for one such prominent reading see Moore 2006).…”

Section: The Indispensably Necessary Illusion Of Ideasmentioning

confidence: 99%

What is this Thing Called ‘Scientific Knowledge’? – Kant on Imaginary Standpoints And the Regulative Role of Reason

Massimi¹

2017

Kant Yearbook

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General rightsCopyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. Take down policyThe University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. what has become known as the 'transcendental illusion' and I offer a novel reading that builds on some of the insights of these earlier readings. I argue that ideas of reason act as imaginary standpoints, which are indispensably necessary for scientific knowledge by making inter-conversational agreement possible. Thus, I characterise scientific knowledge as a distinctive kind of perspectival knowledge. This novel reading can illuminate the role of reason in complementing the faculty of understanding and sheds light on the apparent dichotomy between the first and the second part of the Appendix. More to the point, this novel reading takes us right to the heart of what scientific knowledge is, according to Kant, and how it differs from bogus knowledge and opinion. IntroductionWhat is scientific knowledge? And what is so special about it? We live at a time where these questions, far from being rhetorical, have in fact been dangerously called into question. Experts' knowledge has been publicly attacked, and the line between scientific knowledge and public opinion repeatedly blurred in prominent quarters. When it comes to policy-making about climate change, or else, these questions matter. They could not matter more. And yet, convincing answers to these pressing questions may prove hard to find. In this essay, I present my own reading of one such famous answer given by Immanuel Kant. Kant's fully-fledged answer to the question of "what is scientific knowledge?" spans the full Critical project, and as such goes well beyond the scope and limits of the present essay. My more modest goal here is to re-assess a famous qualification that Kant gave to scientific knowledge in a much debated passage of the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic in the Critique of Pure Reason. In that passage, Kant presents the faculty of reason in its hypothetical use as being directed https://doi.org/10. 1515/kantyb-2017-0004 Brought to you by |

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Section: The Indispensably Necessary Illusion Of Ideasmentioning

confidence: 99%

What is this Thing Called ‘Scientific Knowledge’? – Kant on Imaginary Standpoints And the Regulative Role of Reason

Massimi¹

2017

Kant Yearbook

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“…Este problema fue tratado con cierto detalle por BernardWilliams (1978, 64-5; 1985, 138), quien ofreció razones a favor de la posibilidad de representaciones absolutas. Una defensa más reciente, inspirada en Williams, es de la A.W Moore (1987),. quien posteriormente (1997) desarrolló de manera mucho más sistemática su defensa.…”

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La ciencia como un punto de vista: algunos desafíos a la objetividad científica

Gensollen

Rolland

2018

Daimon

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Algunos críticos de la ciencia afirman que es sólo un punto de vista entre otros, sin alguna autoridad epistémica especial. No obstante, en este artículo se defiende que la concepción de la investigación científica que involucra una perspectiva o punto de vista no impone una restricción a su ideal de objetividad. Primero se presentan algunas aclaraciones sobre la noción de punto de vista, luego se atiende al concepto de objetividad científica, y por último se enfrentan algunos desafíos que se desprenden de la noción de punto de vista y amenazan rasgos de la objetividad científica vinculados con su autoridad epistémica.

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“…An important further influence I want to acknowledge is Moore (1997). For helpful discussion of earlier versions of this paper I thank Naomi Eilan, Hemdat Lerman, Martin Lipman, and Matthew Soteriou, as well as audiences at the University of York and the Aristotelian Society.…”

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XI—Writing on the Page of Consciousness

Hoerl

2015

Proc Aristot Soc

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I identify one particular strand of thought in Thomas Nagel's ‘What Is It Like to Be a Bat?’ (1974), which I think has helped shape a certain conception of perceptual consciousness that is still prevalent in the literature. On this conception, perceptual consciousness is to be explained in terms of a special class of properties perceptual experiences themselves exhibit. I also argue that this conception is in fact in conflict with one of the key ideas that supposedly animates Nagel's argument in ‘What Is It Like to Be a Bat?', which is the idea of an intimate connection between the idea of consciousness and that of a point of view.

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Points of View

Cited by 51 publications

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What is this Thing Called ‘Scientific Knowledge’? – Kant on Imaginary Standpoints And the Regulative Role of Reason

What is this Thing Called ‘Scientific Knowledge’? – Kant on Imaginary Standpoints And the Regulative Role of Reason

La ciencia como un punto de vista: algunos desafíos a la objetividad científica

XI—Writing on the Page of Consciousness

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