Pockets of Effectiveness and Islands of Integrity

Abstract

The administrative quality of states is typically measured at the level of national governments, tacitly presuming organizational strength is evenly distributed throughout the organizations comprising central state administration. However, those organizations vary substantially in providing impartial, effective, and honest administration. This chapter examines variation in the quality of government within central state administrations, a newly consolidating subfield identified with “pockets of effectiveness” or “islands of integrity.” This scholarship analyzes how some state agencies manage to offer high-quality administration in challenging institutional contexts where many peer organizations are weak, ineffectual, or corrupt. The chapter discusses methodological challenges and traces the history of first- and second-wave scholarship in this subfield. Then through meta-analysis, it identifies four major theoretical themes in prior scholarship: technical competence and incentives, external networks, autonomy, and organizational culture. The chapter concludes with promising avenues for future research, identifying ways scholars and practitioners interested in quality of government broadly can benefit from the findings of this subfield.

Brokering Bureaucrats: How Bureaucrats and Civil Society Facilitate Clientelism Where Parties are Weak

“…Second, while prior work on brokering bureaucrats focuses on political appointees (Geddes, 1994; Shefter, 1994), many bureaucrats have secure tenures and thus, at first glance, have weak incentives to broker. Comparative public administration research documents extensive variability in public sector personnel between countries (Dahlström and Lapuente 2017; Peters & Pierre, 2004) but also within countries and even within agencies (e.g., Bersch et al, 2017; McDonnell & Vilaça, 2021). Civil services often consist of a patchwork of contract types, ranging from temporary discretionary appointments to secure positions with legal protection.…”