Pluralism About Knowledge

Abstract

In this paper I consider the prospects for pluralism about knowledge, that is, the view that there is a plurality of knowledge relations. After a brief overview of some views that entail a sort of pluralism about knowledge, I focus on a particular kind of knowledge pluralism I call standards pluralism. Put roughly, standards pluralism is the view that one never knows anything simpliciter. Rather, one knows by this-or-that epistemic standard. Because there is a plurality of epistemic standards, there is a plurality of knowledge relations. In §1 I argue that one can construct an impressive case for standards pluralism. In §2 I clarify the relationship between standards pluralism, epistemic contextualism and epistemic relativism. In §3 I argue that standards pluralism faces a serious objection. The gist of the objection is that standards pluralism is incompatible with plausible claims about the normative role of knowledge. In §4 I finish by sketching the form that a standards pluralist response to this objection might take. Introductory RemarksMonism about some property P or relation R is the view that there is a single P-property or Rrelation. Pluralism about P or R is the view that there is a plurality of P-properties or R-relations.There is a burgeoning literature on whether we should be monists or pluralists about truth (see, for instance, Lynch 2009; Pedersen and Wright 2013; Wright 1992). In this paper I explore whether we should be monists or pluralists about knowledge. The standard view in epistemology is that the knowledge relation is a two-place relation between a subject S and a proposition p of the form K(S, p). 1 The knowledge monist says that there is a single knowledge relation of this form. The knowledge pluralist says that there is a plurality of knowledge relations of this form. I will focus on a kind of knowledge pluralism I call standards pluralism. Put roughly, standards pluralism is the view that one never knows anything simpliciter. Rather, one knows relative to this or that epistemic 1 There is some dissent on this (see e.g. Schaffer 2004a). I comment on this further in fn. 11 and fn. 17.

On pluralism and conceptual engineering: introduction and overview

“…Other authors in the history of analytic philosophy may be interpreted as giving rise to similar forms of pluralism: think, for instance, of Crispin Wright's (1992) pluralism about truth; or of William Alston's (2005) pluralism about epistemic desiderata. Further, very recent proposals may be read as articulating multiple concepts of, for instance, disagreement (MacFarlane 2014), knowledge (McKenna 2017) or grounding (Richardson 2020). In fairness to these authors, I should stress that I am suggesting an interpretation of their writings in terms of conceptual engineering.…”