Plausible 2005–2050 emissions scenarios project between 2 °C and 3 °C of warming by 2100

Pielke, Roger A.; Burgess, Matthew G.; Ritchie, Justin

doi:10.1088/1748-9326/ac4ebf

Cited by 103 publications

(66 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…The AR5 (IPCC, 2014) and SSP (IIASA, 2018) scenarios with FFI CO2 emissions growth rates most consistent with 2005-2020 historical observations and 2020-2050 IEA (2021) Stated Policies projections (differing on average by less than 0.3%/y) project a range of emissions trajectories, the highest of which result in roughly constant FFI emissions to 2100 (Fig. 2A; Pielke et al, 2022). With median climate sensitivities, nearly all of these scenarios project warming of 2-3°C by 2100 (between 3.4 and 4.5W/m 2 forcing), above pre-Industrial levels (Fig.…”

Section: Perspectives On Plausible Emissions and Climate Futuressupporting

confidence: 66%

“…3 in Pielke et al, 2022). The median scenario in this Stated-Policies-consistent range projects 2.2°C warming (Pielke et al, 2022), and an emissions trajectory nearly identical to SSP2-3.4 (Fig. 2A).…”

Section: Perspectives On Plausible Emissions and Climate Futuresmentioning

confidence: 85%

“…3A). Moreover, historically, the IEA has itself tended to over-project coal use and under-project renewable-energy growth, and thus has serially revised down its Stated Policies emissions projections from year to year (e.g., see Hausfather, 2020;Way et al, 2021;Pielke et al, 2022). If this trend continues, then the divergence between the high-emission scenarios and near-future emissions could be even greater than the divergence of these scenarios from IEA's (2021) Stated Policies Projections.…”

Section: The Representative Concentration Pathway (Rcp) and Shared Socioeconomic Pathway (Ssp) Scenariosmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although rising global emissions throughout the 21st century are theoretically possible, there is some evidence suggesting that a century-long plateau in emissions might be a worst-case plausible scenario. The IEA's (2021) Stated Policies scenario-which has historically tended to over-project emissions (Hausfather, 2020;Way et al, 2021;Pielke et al, 2022)-projects that global FFI CO2 emissions will slightly decrease between 2020 and 2050 (Fig. 2A).…”

Section: Perspectives On Plausible Emissions and Climate Futuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…2A,C; see also fig. 3 in Pielke et al, 2022;and Liu & Raftery, 2021). Although the IEA's (2021) Announced Pledges scenario is new, and thus cannot be historically evaluated for accuracy, countries have predominantly failed to meet announced emissions-reduction pledges (Victor et al, 2017).…”

Section: Perspectives On Plausible Emissions and Climate Futuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Climate change scenarios in fisheries and aquatic conservation research

Burgess¹,

Becker²,

Fredston³

et al. 2022

Preprint

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Climate change projections are central to fisheries and aquatic conservation research, and to planning for a warming world. Such projections include assumptions about future emissions pathways and climate-system sensitivity to emissions. Fisheries and aquatic conservation research typically uses emissions scenarios created for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). However, recent climate research and global development trends have significantly changed our understanding of the ranges of plausible emissions pathways to 2100 and climate sensitivities. Here, we provide a concise review of these updates to our understanding of climate futures, and we make recommendations for best-practice use of climate change scenarios in fisheries and aquatic conservation research. Although emissions pathways are subject to deep uncertainty, recent research suggests that emissions scenarios producing a range of approximately 3.4-4.5W/m2 radiative forcing by 2100 might be most plausible. With median climate sensitivities, this corresponds to approximately 2-3 degrees C global warming by 2100. Climate-sensitivity uncertainties expand this range to approximately 1.5-4 degrees C. In terms of the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) and Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs), radiative forcing outcomes mostly fall between SSP2-3.4 and SSP2-4.5/RCP4.5, though higher and lower emissions scenarios (e.g., RCP2.6 and RCP6.0) might be plausible and should be explored in research. However, we argue that uses of the highest-emission scenarios (RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5, SSP3-7.0)—which currently predominate the literature—should come with clearly articulated rationales and appropriate caveats to ensure results are not misinterpreted by scholars, policymakers, and media.

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Section: Perspectives On Plausible Emissions and Climate Futuressupporting

confidence: 66%

Section: Perspectives On Plausible Emissions and Climate Futuresmentioning

confidence: 85%

Section: The Representative Concentration Pathway (Rcp) and Shared Socioeconomic Pathway (Ssp) Scenariosmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Perspectives On Plausible Emissions and Climate Futuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Perspectives On Plausible Emissions and Climate Futuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Climate change scenarios in fisheries and aquatic conservation research

Burgess¹,

Becker²,

Fredston³

et al. 2022

Preprint

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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False springs and spring phenology: Propagating effects of downscaling technique and training data

Wootten,

Dixon,

Adams‐Smith

et al. 2024

Intl Journal of Climatology

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Projected changes to spring phenological indicators (such as first leaf and first bloom) are of importance to assessing the impacts of climate change on ecosystems and species. The risk of false springs (when a killing freeze occurs after plants of interest bloom), which can cause ecological and economic damage, is also projected to change across much of the United States. Given the coarse nature of global climate models, downscaled climate projections have commonly been used to assess local changes in spring phenological indices. Few studies that examine the influence of the sources of uncertainty sources in the downscaling approach on projections of phenological changes. This study examines the influence of sources of uncertainty on projections of spring phenological indicators and false spring risk using the South Central United States. The downscaled climate projections were created using three statistical downscaling techniques applied with three gridded observation datasets as training data and three global climate models. This study finds that projections of spring phenological indicators and false spring risk are primarily sensitive to the choice of global climate models. However, this study also finds that the formulation of the downscaling approach can cause errors representing the daily low‐temperature distribution, which can cause errors in false spring risk by failing to capture the timing between the last spring freeze and the first bloom. One should carefully consider the downscaling approach used when using downscaled climate projections to assess changes to spring phenology and false spring risk.

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Clumsy solutions and climate change: A retrospective

Verweij

2022

WIREs Climate Change

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In 1989, Steve Rayner chided fellow anthropologists for "fiddling while the world warms." This was the starting point of a decades-long application to human-made climate change of the cultural theory that he had developed with Mary Douglas and Michael Thompson. It culminated in a call to develop "clumsy" solutions for addressing the issue. Since then, the concept of clumsy solutions has been applied, praised, and criticised. To clarify its strengths and weaknesses, I first set out cultural theory and explain how the notion of clumsy solutions was derived from it. I then assess the extent to which this notion has increased our understanding of climate change governance. I do so by breaking up the application of this concept into seven predictions, concerning: (1) the major perspectives among stakeholders on how to resolve climate change; (2) the fate of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol; (3) the feasibility of international emissions trading; (4) the possibility of making renewable energy competitive; (5) the need for domestic governmental action to realize this possibility; (6) the effectiveness of a nonbinding global treaty to combat climate change; and (7) the need to explore adaptation, carbon capture, and geoengineering. I show that these predictions have stood the test of time. Finally, I discuss the roles that the concept of clumsy solutions can play in future climate change governance. This article is written in memory of Steve Rayner, one of the first social scientists to focus on climate change.

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Plausible 2005–2050 emissions scenarios project between 2 °C and 3 °C of warming by 2100

Cited by 103 publications

References 23 publications

Climate change scenarios in fisheries and aquatic conservation research

Climate change scenarios in fisheries and aquatic conservation research

False springs and spring phenology: Propagating effects of downscaling technique and training data

Clumsy solutions and climate change: A retrospective

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