Planners’ Preferences: Optimality, Distribution and Social Welfare

Sen, Amartya; Margolis, Julius; Guitton, Henri

doi:10.1007/978-1-349-15294-0_8

Cited by 18 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Very shortly thereafter, Lerner (1944) showed that expected social welfare could be maximized, under certain symmetry conditions, by equalizing income -see Sen (1969Sen ( , 1973 for futher discussion of this result.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Harsanyi’s Utilitarian Theorem: A Simpler Proof and Some Ethical Connotations

Hammond

1992

Rational Interaction

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Harsanyi's utilitarian theorem states that the social welfare function is the weighted sum of individuals' utility functions if: (i) society maximizes expected social welfare; (ii) individuals maximize expected utility; (iii) society is indifferent between two probability distributions over social states whenever all individuals are. After giving a simpler proof, an alternative axiomatic foundation for Vickrey-Harsanyi utilitarianism is provided. By making using an extended version of Harsanyi's concept of a player's "type" in the theory of games with incomplete information, the problem of forming social objectives when there is incomplete information can also be resolved, at least in principle.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Harsanyi’s Utilitarian Theorem: A Simpler Proof and Some Ethical Connotations

Hammond

1992

Rational Interaction

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“…Strict proofs for this generalisation were later given by Sen (1969) and -differently in each case -in Breit/Culbertson (1970), in McManus/Walton/Coffman (1972), and in McCain (1972). Strict proofs for this generalisation were later given by Sen (1969) and -differently in each case -in Breit/Culbertson (1970), in McManus/Walton/Coffman (1972), and in McCain (1972).…”

Section: If Then the Equi-distribution Vector X X Produces A Valumentioning

confidence: 94%

Distributional equality in non-classical utilitarianism — A proof of Lerner's theorem for ‘utilitarianism incorporating justice’

Schäfer

Trapp

1989

Theory Decis

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The paper initially proposes a non-classical utilitarian aggregation function which is accomplished by suitably weaving around the classical utilitarian function a group of parameters of justice (including desert factors and a sublinear measure of inequality which mathematically favours more equal distribution of utility levels). Then the Lernertheorem for classical utilitarianism is first proved in a way which differs from each of the earlier proofs presented for this theorem and in the core of the paper also extended to this new non-classical version of utilitarianism.Keywords: Utilitarianism including some parameters of justice (such as desert factors, measures of inequality of utility levels).Theory and Decision 26 (1989) 157-173. 9 1989 by Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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“…This proposition has caused considerable controversy in welfare economics. The controversy is reviewed and Lerner's analysis extended in Sen (1969). See also Breit and Culbertson (1970).…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 97%

Utility Interdependence and Redistribution: Methodological Implications for Welfare Economics and the Theory of the Public Household

Johnston

1975

Public Finance Quarterly

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A rapidly developing literature has focused on utility interdependence as a AbUract basis for a nontraditional approach to redistribution. Discussions in this literature have tended to pursue particular points without reference to the broader context within which such discussions are methodologically situated. Yet an understanding of that context is essential to a reasoned appraisal of much of the literature. This paper attempts to examine that broader context and in doing so to provide clarification of some of the issues which have evolved in the literature. Part one investigates the relationship between the problems which redistribution poses for welfare economics and the theory of the public household. Part two appraises various attempts to circumvent these problems by replacing variousequity rationales for redistribution in the traditional framework with various efficiency rationales. Part three concentrates on the utility interdependence approach often identified with the term "Pareto optimal redistribution" by discussing methodological implications of such an approach for welfare economics and the theory of the public household.

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Planners’ Preferences: Optimality, Distribution and Social Welfare

Cited by 18 publications

References 7 publications

Harsanyi’s Utilitarian Theorem: A Simpler Proof and Some Ethical Connotations

Harsanyi’s Utilitarian Theorem: A Simpler Proof and Some Ethical Connotations

Distributional equality in non-classical utilitarianism — A proof of Lerner's theorem for ‘utilitarianism incorporating justice’

Utility Interdependence and Redistribution: Methodological Implications for Welfare Economics and the Theory of the Public Household

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