PIR-PSI: Scaling Private Contact Discovery

Demmler, Daniel; Rindal, Peter; Rosulek, Mike; Trieu, Ni

doi:10.1515/popets-2018-0037

Cited by 65 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…Here we compare our HPIR design with state-of-the-art (homogenous) two-server PIR designs of PIR-PSI [19] and RAID-PIR [18], as well as the state-of-the-art single-server SealPIR [4], in terms of computation and communication costs. Note that not all PIR protocols can be converted into an HPIR format, so we compare with their regular (homogenous) versions.…”

Section: Comparison With State-of-the-art Pir Protocolsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We download a 10.95MB file from a 2GB database. PIR-PSI [19] is based on the distributed point function (DPF) rather than secret sharing; therefore there is no trivial way to convert them into an HPIR setting.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The two-server protocol of PIR-PSI [19] and the singleserver SealPIR [4] provide computational security, so we compare them with our computational HPIR protocol (with PRNG). For fair comparisons, we use the original implementation of PIR-PSI [45] and SealPIR [47], and we use the original values for retrieved file sizes used in their implementations.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Heterogeneous Private Information Retrieval

Mozaffari

Houmansadr

2020

Proceedings 2020 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium

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Private information retrieval (PIR) enables clients to query and retrieve data from untrusted servers without the untrusted servers learning which data was retrieved. In this paper, we present a new class of multi-server PIR protocols, which we call heterogeneous PIR (HPIR). In such multi-server PIR protocols, the computation and communication overheads imposed on the PIR servers are non-uniform, i.e., some servers handle higher computation/communication burdens than the others. This enables heterogeneous PIR protocols to be suitable for a range of new PIR applications. What enables us to enforce such heterogeneity is a unique PIR-tailored secret sharing algorithm that we leverage in building our PIR protocol. We have implemented our HPIR protocol and evaluated its performance in comparison with regular (i.e., homogenous) PIR protocols. Our evaluations demonstrate that a querying client can trade off the computation and communication loads of the (heterogeneous) PIR servers by adjusting some parameters. For example in a two server scenario with a heterogeneity degree of 4/1, to retrieve a 456KB file from a 0.2GB database, the rich (i.e., resourceful) PIR server will do 1.1 seconds worth of computation compared to 0.3 seconds by the poor (resourceconstrained) PIR server; this is while each of the servers would do the same 1 seconds of computation in a homogeneous settings. Also, for this given example, our HPIR protocol will impose a 912KB communication bandwidth on the rich server compared to 228KB on the poor server (by contrast to 456KB overheads on each of the servers for a traditional homogeneous design).

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Section: Comparison With State-of-the-art Pir Protocolsmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Heterogeneous Private Information Retrieval

Mozaffari

Houmansadr

2020

Proceedings 2020 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium

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“…We assume that communicating clients already know each others' long-term public keys. Talek is compatible with bootstrapping keys from other applications [5,34] or identity-based encryption [16,17,62]. We assume each server has a public-private key pair, pk, sk, generated using an algorithm PKGen(), and that all server public keys are known to all users.…”

Section: Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Talek: Private Group Messaging with Hidden Access Patterns

Cheng

Scott

Masserova

et al. 2020

Annual Computer Security Applications Conference

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“…Demmler et al [14] use a PIR based on distributed point functions (DPF) to construct a multi-server private setintersection protocol optimized for unbalanced set sizes. In addition to a performant implementation, they also touch on deployment considerations, which we also discuss in Section V-D.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Revisiting User Privacy for Certificate Transparency

Kales

Omolola

Ramacher

2019

2019 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)

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Public key infrastructure (PKI) based on certificate authorities is one of the cornerstones of secure communication over the internet. Certificates issued as part of this PKI provide authentication of web servers among others. Yet, the PKI ecosystem is susceptible to certificate misissuance and misuse attacks. To prevent those attacks, Certificate Transparency (CT) facilitates auditing of issued certificates and detecting certificates issued without authorization. Users that want to verify inclusion of certificates on CT log servers contact the CT server directly to retrieve inclusion proofs. This direct contact with the log server creates a privacy problem since the users' browsing activities could be recorded by the log server owner. Lueks and Goldberg (FC 2015) suggested the use of Private Information Retrieval (PIR) in order to protect the users' privacy in the CT ecosystem. With the immense amount of certificates included on CT log servers, their approach runs into performance issues, however. Nevertheless, we build on this approach and extend it using multi-tier Merkle trees, and render it practical using multi-server PIR protocols based on distributed point functions (DPFs). Our approach leads to a scalable design suitable to handle the increasing number of certificates and is, in addition, generic allowing instantiations using secure accumulators and PIRs. We implement and test this mechanism for privacy-preserving membership proof retrieval and show that it can be integrated without disrupting existing CT infrastructure. Most importantly, even for larger CT logs containing 2 31 certificates, our approach using sub-accumulators can provide privacy with a performance overhead of less than 9 milliseconds in total. 3 https://www.section.io/blog/chrome-ct-compliance/ 4 Precertificates are certificates provided to the log before the issuance of the actual certificate. They contain a special critical poison extension that renders the certificate unusable in TLS connections.

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PIR-PSI: Scaling Private Contact Discovery

Cited by 65 publications

References 25 publications

Heterogeneous Private Information Retrieval

Heterogeneous Private Information Retrieval

Talek: Private Group Messaging with Hidden Access Patterns

Revisiting User Privacy for Certificate Transparency

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