Piling On: Multilevel Government and the Fiscal Common‐Pool

Abstract

This article discusses the common-pool problems that arise when multiple territorially overlapping governments share the authority to provide services and levy taxes in a common geographic area. Contrary to the traditional Tiebout model in which increasing the number of competing governments improves efficiency, I argue that increasing the number of overlapping governments results in "overfishing" from the shared tax base. I test the model empirically using data from U.S. counties and find a strong positive relationship between the number of overlapping jurisdictions and the size of the local public sector. Substantively, the "overlap effect" amounts to roughly 10% of local revenue.

Polycentricity and the Hollow State: Exploring Shared Personnel as a Source of Connectivity in Fragmented Urban Systems

“…Fragmented water service provision creates opportunities for flexibility, responsiveness, and services well‐ tailored to local populations (Swyngedouw, Kaïka, & Castro, ), but can also result in disparate local outcomes (Kim et al, ; Mullin, ; Scott et al, ). Moreover, independent providers face regional collective action challenges (Feiock, ), such as how shared environmental (Kim et al, ) and economic (Berry, ) resources are allocated. The EoG framework (Lubell, ) has emerged as a way to understand how network structures form and evolve as policy actors pursue their aims within polycentric governance systems.…”

“…Public services are increasingly delivered via private (Hefetz & Warner, ), specialized (Shi, ), and highly localized (Feiock, ) organizations. This fragmentation of local governance responsibilities poses an array of regional coordination challenges (Feiock, ), complicating both the production of public goods (Oakerson & Parks, ) and the management of common pool resources (Berry, ) by increasing the number of independent organizations involved. One prominent example of fragmentation and its ensuing challenges is with regional drinking water provision (Kim, Keane, & Bernard, ; Scott, Moldogaziev, & Greer, ; Teodoro & Switzer, ).…”

Determinants of Debt Concentration at the State Level

“…The empirical results are mixed at best (Boyne ). Dolan () finds that fragmentation drives up the cost of government in Chicago, and Berry () finds that increased overlap in jurisdictions increases the total spending in U.S. counties. Hendrick, Benedict, and Lal () identifies various types of fragmentation and finds mixed results that can be used to support both claims that centralization and fragmentation can reduce spending, depending on how they are measured.…”

The politics of municipal fragmentation in Ghana

“…There is also general agreement in the literature that fragmentation of general-purpose governments leads to lower spending, but fragmentation of special-purpose governments produces the opposite effect (see Berry 2008, Craw 2008and Stansel 2006. There is likely to be greater competition among multi-purpose governments that offer different bundles of services, compared to special-purpose governments that offer single types of services (Boyne 1998;Stansel 2006).…”