Physician Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence

Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Hennig‐Schmidt, Heike; Kairies-Schwarz, Nadja; Kokot, Johanna; Wiesen, Daniel

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3467583

Cited by 20 publications

(48 citation statements)

References 61 publications

(90 reference statements)

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“…For one thing, medical students are future physicians and economics students are future managers. Moreover, experimental evidence indicates that the behavior of students and physicians does not differ qualitatively (Brosig-Koch et al, 2016;Brosig-Koch, Hennig-Schmidt, Kairies-Schwarz, Kokot, & Wiesen, 2018;Wang, Iversen, Hennig-Schmidt, & Godager, 2017). Further, it has been shown that dishonest student behavior is a predictor for behavior in prospective work environments.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dishonesty in health care practice: A behavioral experiment on upcoding in neonatology

2018

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Dishonest behavior significantly increases the cost of medical care provision. Upcoding of patients is a common form of fraud to attract higher reimbursements. Imposing audit mechanisms including fines to curtail upcoding is widely discussed among health care policy‐makers. How audits and fines affect individual health care providers' behavior is empirically not well understood. To provide new evidence on fraudulent behavior in health care, we analyze the effect of a random audit including fines on individuals' honesty by means of a novel controlled behavioral experiment framed in a neonatal care context. Prevalent dishonest behavior declines significantly when audits and fines are introduced. The effect is driven by a reduction in upcoding when being detectable. Yet upcoding increases when not being detectable as fraudulent. We find evidence that individual characteristics (gender, medical background, and integrity) are related to dishonest behavior. Policy implications are discussed.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dishonesty in health care practice: A behavioral experiment on upcoding in neonatology

2018

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“…Role playing as physicians, subjects decide on the quality of health care for a set of hypothetical patients. 4 Each subject chooses a medical-4 Hypothetical patient pro…les, characterizing patients through di¤erent bene…ts from medical treatment decisions, have been employed in several behavioral experiments in health with medical and non-medcial students (e.g., Hennig-Schmidt, Selten, Wiesen, 2011;Kesternich, Schumacher, Winter, 2015;and Brosig-Koch et al, 2017) and practicing physicians (e.g., Brosig-Koch et al, 2016, 2019. service quality q from a …nite set f0; 1; 2; : : : ; 10g.…”

Section: Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Changing Preferences: An Experiment and Estimation of Market-Incentive Effects on Altruism

2019

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“…Recent studies show that physicians perform more invasive treatments if this increases reimbursement [ 4 , 5 ] and increase consultation frequency not to improve treatment quality but to increase reimbursement [ 6 ]. There is also a growing amount of literature on experiments in health economics which shows that subjects playing the physician’s role care for patients to different extents [ 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 ].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Physician Behavior under Prospective Payment Schemes—Evidence from Artefactual Field and Lab Experiments

Reif

Hafner

Seebauer

2020

IJERPH

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Recent experimental studies analyze the behavior of physicians towards patients and find that physicians care for their own profit as well as patient benefit. In this paper, we extend the experimental analysis of the physician decision problem by adding a third party which represents the health insurance that finances medical service provision under a prospective payment scheme. Our results show that physicians take into account the payoffs of the third party, which can lead to underprovision of medical care. We conduct a laboratory experiment in neutral as well as in medical framing using students and medical doctors as subjects. Subjects in the medically framed experiments behave weakly and are more patient orientated in contrast to neutral framing. A sample of medical doctors exhibits comparable behavior to students with medical framing.

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Physician Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence

Abstract: are highly indebted to the support of the Zi-Zentralinstitut für die kassenärztliche Versorgung of the Federal Republic of Germany. We are grateful for valuable comments and suggestions from Nick Bloom

Cited by 20 publications

References 61 publications

Dishonesty in health care practice: A behavioral experiment on upcoding in neonatology

Dishonesty in health care practice: A behavioral experiment on upcoding in neonatology

Changing Preferences: An Experiment and Estimation of Market-Incentive Effects on Altruism

Physician Behavior under Prospective Payment Schemes—Evidence from Artefactual Field and Lab Experiments

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