Physical‐layer intrusion detection system for smart jamming attacks

Abstract

In modern electronic warfare, physical-layer security threats have evolved from traditional jammers to smart jammers. Smart jammers, due to their stealthy nature, make wireless communication systems vulnerable. They can easily deceive a detection system. In this paper, a physical-layer intrusion detection system (PLIDS) for direct-sequence spread-spectrum systems is developed against smart jammers, which is efficient due to its high detection rates, usability, and accuracy. Smart jamming noise is modeled as wide-sense stationary, additive, and colored. This random process is decomposed into a series expansion of independent and uncorrelated random variables. The decomposition helps in designing a signal processing algorithm for PLIDS. The algorithm is easily implemented via correlators. PLIDS is evaluated using a simulated electronic warfare environment, and its performance is measured in terms of detection capability, precision, and accuracy. It performs error-free detection by adjusting its tuning parameter. Moreover, different performance tradeoffs are observed for different values of the tuning parameter. Finally, comparisons of PLIDS are done with competitive intrusion detection systems.

Convergence of detection probability, computational gains, and asymptotic analysis of an algorithm for physical‐layer intrusion detection system

“…The same case stands with other physical‐layer detection schemes presented in other works, in which asymptotic analysis is not presented. Main contribution of this work involves analyzing asymptotic performance of the proposed PLIDS in terms of computational complexity, space complexity, and input scale. For this purpose, an algorithmic description of the PLIDS is first developed in Section 5 for the PLIDS, which is missing in the work of Yousaf et al…”

“…In order to calculate the improvement in detection probability and computational gain, three different cases are analyzed, and in all three different cases, the proposed PLIDS is implemented at the physical‐layer of the TCP/IP protocol stack, as shown in Figure . In the first case, computational gain is analyzed by placing PLIDS and ALIDS together at respective layers.…”

“…At physical‐layer, DoS attacks are executed with the help of either TJ or SJ. TJ cannot penetrate into the TCP/IP protocol stack, and therefore, it only affects physical‐layer, whereas SJ can penetrate into the TCP/IP protocol stack and can go above (Figure ) if not detected at the physical‐layer …”

“…Similarly, detail of asymptotic performance is missing from physical‐layer IDSs presented in other works . Moreover, the PLIDS presented in the work of Yousaf et al also lacks asymptotic analysis for which asymptotic performance metric P is derived in Section 6. Apart from asymptotic analysis, some additional advantages of using PLIDS are discussed in Sections 7 to 9.…”

“…Initially, a known short key signal s K ( t ), secretly encapsulated in s ( t ), is transmitted by the DSSS transmitter that is received by the DSSS receiver as r K ( t ). The DSSS receiver with the help of received key signal, ie, r K ( t ), generates a signal y ( t ) in the presence or in the absence of jamming signal j ( t ) after simple preprocessing of r F ( t ) or r H ( t ), respectively. The preprocessed generated signal y ( t ) serves as an input to PLIDS where n ( t ) is AWGN.…”