Physical layer authentication scheme with channel based tag padding sequence

Ran, Yachao; Al-Shwaily, Harith Fakhrey Tahir; Tang, Chaoqing; Tian, Gui Yun; Johnston, Martin

doi:10.1049/iet-com.2018.5749

Cited by 12 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Lin et al [25] worked on optimizing the spectral efficiency of mobile users by authenticating each user's CSI. Additionally, notions of channelbased physical-layer authentication and feature selection in abnormal detection can be extended to enhance security in D2D clustering problems [26], [27].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When the attacker does not forge the CSI feedback (i.e., 'No CSI forgery'), the clustering failure probability is 1 N = 0.2 since the attacker only has the chance of being selected as the CH equally with the other normal users. When we consider the defense mechanism with the proposed β value in (27), we can achieve the low clustering failure probability for various α values. However, we should carefully set the β value as the inappropriate β value (e.g., β = 5.0) will not ensure the effectiveness of the defense mechanism.…”

Section: A Impact Of the Clustering Failure Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…3b shows a comparison of the clustering failure probabilities when we consider optimal β ⋆ based on exhaustive searching in Fig. 3a for given the α values, suboptimal β proposed in (27), and two reference threshold values (i.e., 0.5σ 2 h and 2σ 2 h ). Using (27), we can achieve almost near-optimal performance in terms of the clustering failure probability, but we incur a performance loss if threshold values are arbitrarily set.…”

Section: A Impact Of the Clustering Failure Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…3a for given the α values, suboptimal β proposed in (27), and two reference threshold values (i.e., 0.5σ 2 h and 2σ 2 h ). Using (27), we can achieve almost near-optimal performance in terms of the clustering failure probability, but we incur a performance loss if threshold values are arbitrarily set. Note that we should carefully verify the feasibility of our proposed method to determine suboptimal β value on different simulation parameters such as channel variance σ 2 h .…”

Section: A Impact Of the Clustering Failure Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Fig. 4 compares the clustering failure probabilities using the optimal β ⋆ and proposed β in (27) for different channel variance σ 2 h values. As we discussed, for any α values, our proposed method to set suboptimal β values can achieve near optimal performance in terms of the clustering failure probability.…”

Section: A Impact Of the Clustering Failure Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

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On the Effect of Malicious User on D2D Cluster: CSI Forgery and Countermeasures

et al. 2023

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Device-to-device (D2D) communication in cellular networks refers to a technology that enables direct transmission and reception between devices in proximity without infrastructures such as base stations (BSs). It has consistently attracted attention due to its key role extending cellular coverage through the configuration of clusters, in which the D2D devices belonging to a cluster can either be a cluster head or a cluster member. In this paper, we investigate the effect of channel state information (CSI) forgery attacks of a single malicious user (i.e., attacker) belonging to a cluster. Particularly, we investigate two major threat models: 1) clustering failure attack, where an attacker reports its overestimated CSI instead of the original one to the BS during clustering, 2) quality of service (QoS) degradation attack where an attacker reports its underestimated CSI instead of the original one to the cluster head during the intracluster D2D communications (i.e., D2D multicasting). We define metrics to measure each CSI forgery attack as clustering failure probability and cluster sum-rate, respectively, and further derive a closed-form expression for the clustering failure probability. In addition, we propose threshold-based defense mechanisms as countermeasures against CSI forgery attacks and find suboptimal threshold values. Through simulations, we evaluate the performance of the defense mechanisms in terms of clustering failure probability and cluster sum-rate, comparing with optimal simulation results. INDEX TERMSWireless network security, device-to-device (D2D) communications, D2D clustering, channel state information (CSI), CSI forgery. JONGHYUN KIM (Member, IEEE) received the Ph.D. degree in computer science from The

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Impact Of the Clustering Failure Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%