Physical Characterization of Arbiter PUFs

Tajik, Shahin; Dietz, Enrico; Frohmann, Sven; Seifert, Jean-Pierre; Nedospasov, Dmitry; Helfmeier, Clemens; Boit, Christian; Dittrich, Helmar

doi:10.1007/978-3-662-44709-3_27

“…They became a vibrant field of research during the last years and promised to be "a means of building secure smartcards" due to their assumed resistance to physical attacks [76]. Very recently, however, it was shown that SRAM PUFs are not unclonable [88] and the same setup that we used for the photonic side channel attacks was used to prove that all arbiter PUFs can be completely and linearly characterized by means of PEA [166].…”

Section: Advice For Cryptographersmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This was the consistent further development of the original setup. It was also used in [166]. This system does not require multiple detection gates, but allows to measure the traces in free-running mode.…”

Section: Improved Setupmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Cryptography Should Not Rely on Physical Attack Complexity

Krämer

¹

2015

T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services

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Ich versichere an Eides statt, dass ich diese Dissertation selbständig verfasst und nur die angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel verwendet habe. Datum Für meine Eltern AbstractEver since the first side channel attacks and fault attacks on cryptographic devices were introduced in the mid-nineties, new possibilities of physical attacks have been consistently explored. The risk that these attacks pose is reduced by reacting to known attacks and by developing and implementing countermeasures against them. For physical attacks whose theory is known but which have not been conducted yet, however, the situation is different. Attacks whose physical realization is assumed to be very complex are taken less seriously. The trust that these attacks will not be realized due to their physical complexity means that no countermeasures are developed at all. This leads to unprotected devices once the assessment of the complexity turns out to be wrong.This thesis presents two practical physical attacks whose theory is known for several years. Since neither attack has previously been successfully implemented in practice, however, they were not considered a serious threat. Their physical attack complexity has been overestimated and the implied security threat has been underestimated. First, we introduce the photonic side channel, which offers not only temporal resolution, but also the highest possible spatial resolution. Due to the high cost of its first realization, it has not been taken seriously. We show both simple and differential photonic side channel analyses. Then, we present a fault attack against pairing-based cryptography. Due to the need for at least two independent precise faults in a single pairing computation, it has also not been taken seriously. We show how attackers can reveal the secret key of symmetric as well as asymmetric cryptographic algorithms based on these physical attacks. We present countermeasures on the software and the hardware level, which help to prevent these attacks in the future.Based on these two presented attacks, this thesis shows that the assessment of physical attack complexity is error-prone. Hence, cryptography should not rely on it. Cryptographic technologies have to be protected against all physical attacks, have they already been realized or not. The development of countermeasures does not require the successful execution of an attack but can already be carried out as soon as the principle of a side channel or a fault attack is understood.

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“…This basic methodology can be applied to many different attack vectors. The first result in this direction, a physical characterization of arbiter Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs), has already been published [166].…”

Section: Exploring the Full Attack Potentialmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why cryptography should not rely on physical attack complexity

Krämer

¹

2016

It - Information Technology

2

0

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Ich versichere an Eides statt, dass ich diese Dissertation selbständig verfasst und nur die angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel verwendet habe. Datum Für meine Eltern AbstractEver since the first side channel attacks and fault attacks on cryptographic devices were introduced in the mid-nineties, new possibilities of physical attacks have been consistently explored. The risk that these attacks pose is reduced by reacting to known attacks and by developing and implementing countermeasures against them. For physical attacks whose theory is known but which have not been conducted yet, however, the situation is different. Attacks whose physical realization is assumed to be very complex are taken less seriously. The trust that these attacks will not be realized due to their physical complexity means that no countermeasures are developed at all. This leads to unprotected devices once the assessment of the complexity turns out to be wrong.This thesis presents two practical physical attacks whose theory is known for several years. Since neither attack has previously been successfully implemented in practice, however, they were not considered a serious threat. Their physical attack complexity has been overestimated and the implied security threat has been underestimated. First, we introduce the photonic side channel, which offers not only temporal resolution, but also the highest possible spatial resolution. Due to the high cost of its first realization, it has not been taken seriously. We show both simple and differential photonic side channel analyses. Then, we present a fault attack against pairing-based cryptography. Due to the need for at least two independent precise faults in a single pairing computation, it has also not been taken seriously. We show how attackers can reveal the secret key of symmetric as well as asymmetric cryptographic algorithms based on these physical attacks. We present countermeasures on the software and the hardware level, which help to prevent these attacks in the future.Based on these two presented attacks, this thesis shows that the assessment of physical attack complexity is error-prone. Hence, cryptography should not rely on it. Cryptographic technologies have to be protected against all physical attacks, have they already been realized or not. The development of countermeasures does not require the successful execution of an attack but can already be carried out as soon as the principle of a side channel or a fault attack is understood.

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“…Tajik et al [37,38] and Ganji et al [11] showed that PUFs, including XOR Arbiter PUFs, can be efficiently modeled if additional information about the chip is retrieved in an attack that requires physical access to the PUF. We are convinced that these attacks can very easily be adopted to also work against our proposed XOR Majority Vote Arbiter PUF.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…side channel [6,28,34], invasive [27,29], and fault injection attacks [7,37]. To our knowledge there is no known strong PUF design that is secure against physical attacks without classical hardware security measures that are also applied to secure flash memory.…”

Section: Resilience Against Physical Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Attackers Lose: Design and Security Analysis of Arbitrarily Large XOR Arbiter PUFs

Wisiol

¹

,

Graebnitz²,

Margraf

³

et al.

EPiC Series in Computing

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In a novel analysis, we formally prove that arbitrarily many Arbiter PUFs can be combined into a stable XOR Arbiter PUF. To the best of our knowledge, this design cannot be modeled by any known oracle access attack in polynomial time.Using majority vote of arbiter chain responses, our analysis shows that with a polynomial number of votes, the XOR Arbiter PUF stability of almost all challenges can be boosted exponentially close to 1; that is, the stability gain through majority voting can exceed the stability loss introduced by large XORs for a feasible number of votes. Considering state-of-the-art modeling attacks by Becker and Rührmair et al., our proposal enables the designer to increase the attacker's effort exponentially while still maintaining polynomial design effort. This is the first result that relates PUF design to this traditional cryptographic design principle.

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Physical Characterization of Arbiter PUFs

Cited by 99 publications

References 28 publications

Why Cryptography Should Not Rely on Physical Attack Complexity

Why Cryptography Should Not Rely on Physical Attack Complexity

Why cryptography should not rely on physical attack complexity

Why Attackers Lose: Design and Security Analysis of Arbitrarily Large XOR Arbiter PUFs

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