Phylogenetic analysis of H9N2 avian influenza viruses in Afghanistan (2016-2017)

Hosseini, Hossein; Ghalyanchilangeroudi, Arash; Mehrabadi, Mohammad Hossein Fallah; Sediqian, Mohammad Saeed; Shayeganmehr, A; Ghafouri, Seyed Ali; Maghsoudloo, Hossein; Abdollahi, Hamed; Farahani, Reza Kh

doi:10.1007/s00705-017-3474-2

Cited by 11 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…H9N2 viruses are considered endemic in Bangladesh and Pakistan and are likely endemic in regions of India, Afghanistan and Nepal [20,34,35,36,37,38,39]. G1 ‘Western’ viruses constitute the majority of viruses found in poultry in South Asia, with a few Y439 viruses occasionally spilling over into poultry from wild birds (but apparently not maintaining sustained transmission).…”

Section: History and Phylogeography Of H9n2 Virus In Poultrymentioning

confidence: 99%

A Global Perspective on H9N2 Avian Influenza Virus

Peacock

James

Sealy

et al. 2019

Viruses

233

160

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H9N2 avian influenza viruses have become globally widespread in poultry over the last two decades and represent a genuine threat both to the global poultry industry but also humans through their high rates of zoonotic infection and pandemic potential. H9N2 viruses are generally hyperendemic in affected countries and have been found in poultry in many new regions in recent years. In this review, we examine the current global spread of H9N2 avian influenza viruses as well as their host range, tropism, transmission routes and the risk posed by these viruses to human health.

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Section: History and Phylogeography Of H9n2 Virus In Poultrymentioning

confidence: 99%

A Global Perspective on H9N2 Avian Influenza Virus

Peacock

James

Sealy

et al. 2019

Viruses

233

160

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“…In contrast, G1-h9.4.1 isolates from west Asia and the Middle East have mostly been replaced by the most recent G1-h9.4.2 strains. The G1-h9.4.2 viruses are widely distributed and endemic in poultry in the Middle East (Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), Egypt, Bangladesh, Pakistan, regions of India, Afghanistan, and Nepal (Table 2; Tosh et al 2008;Hosseini et al 2017). G1-h9.4.2 viruses have been identified in poultry in Morocco, Ghana, Burkina Faso (Zecchin et al 2017), and Uganda (Byarugaba et al 2018).…”

Section: Eurasian Lineagementioning

confidence: 99%

H9 Influenza Viruses: An Emerging Challenge

Carnaccini

Pérez

2019

Cold Spring Harb Perspect Med

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Influenza A viruses (IAVs) of the H9 subtype are enzootic in Asia, the Middle East, and parts of North and Central Africa, where they cause significant economic losses to the poultry industry. Of note, some strains of H9N2 viruses have been linked to zoonotic episodes of mild respiratory diseases. Because of the threat posed by H9N2 viruses to poultry and human health, these viruses are considered of pandemic concern by the World Health Organization (WHO). H9N2 IAVs continue to diversify into multiple antigenically and phylogenetically distinct lineages that can further promote the emergence of strains with pandemic potential. Somewhat neglected compared with the H5 and H7 subtypes, there are numerous indicators that H9N2 viruses could be involved directly or indirectly in the emergence of the next influenza pandemic. The goal of this work is to discuss the state of knowledge on H9N2 IAVs and to provide an update on the contemporary global situation.

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“…The A(H9N2) viruses circulating in terrestrial poultry in Northern Africa, the Middle East and part of South Asia belong to the G1-like group, derived from a progenitor detected for the first time in a quail in Hong Kong in 1997. Genetic characterisation of the G1-like viruses detected in recent years in Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Iraq, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh provided evidence for a high degree of within-group variation, a preference for both avian-like and human-like receptors and the absence of multiple basic amino acids at the HA cleavage site, suggesting low pathogenicity for poultry (Davidson et al, 2013;Shanmuganatham et al, 2014;Bahari et al, 2015;Body et al, 2015;Kammon et al, 2015;El Houadfi et al, 2016;Gowthaman et al, 2016;Lau et al, 2016;Lee et al, 2016b;Hosseini et al, 2017;Kandeil et al, 2017b). Evidence of the circulation of an G1-like A(H9N2) antigenic variant highly adapted to quail was recently provided in Egypt (Adel et al, 2017;Kandeil et al, 2017b).…”

Section: Genetic Characterisationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Avian influenza overview October 2016–August 2017

Brown¹,

Mulatti²,

Śmietanka³

et al. 2017

EFS2

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The A(H5N8) highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) epidemic occurred in 29 European countries in 2016/2017 and has been the largest ever recorded in the EU in terms of number of poultry outbreaks, geographical extent and number of dead wild birds. Multiple primary incursions temporally related with all major poultry sectors affected but secondary spread was most commonly associated with domestic waterfowl species. A massive effort of all the affected EU Member States (MSs) allowed a descriptive epidemiological overview of the cases in poultry, captive birds and wild birds, providing also information on measures applied at the individual MS level. Data on poultry population structure are required to facilitate data and risk factor analysis, hence to strengthen science-based advice to risk managers. It is suggested to promote common understanding and application of definitions related to control activities and their reporting across MSs. Despite a large number of human exposures to infected poultry occurred during the ongoing outbreaks, no transmission to humans has been identified. Monitoring the avian influenza (AI) situation in other continents indicated a potential risk of long-distance spread of HPAI virus (HPAIV) A(H5N6) from Asia to wintering grounds towards Western Europe, similarly to what happened with HPAIV A(H5N8) and HPAIV A(H5N1) in previous years. Furthermore, the HPAI situation in Africa with A(H5N8) and A(H5N1) is rapidly evolving. Strengthening collaborations at National, EU and Global levels would allow close monitoring of the AI situation, ultimately helping to increase preparedness. No human case was reported in the EU due to AIVs subtypes A(H5N1), A(H5N6), A(H7N9) and A(H9N2). Direct transmission of these viruses to humans has only been reported in areas, mainly in Asia and Egypt, with a substantial involvement of wild bird and/or poultry populations. It is suggested to improve the collection and reporting of exposure events of people to AI. (7) of the above mentioned Decision, the concerned experts were allowed to take part in the discussions and in the drafting phase of the EFSA Scientific report on Avian influenza monitoring (Art. 31) -overview October 2016 -August 2017, and have not been allowed to be, or act as, a chairman, a vice-chairman or rapporteur of the WG.

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Phylogenetic analysis of H9N2 avian influenza viruses in Afghanistan (2016-2017)

Cited by 11 publications

References 22 publications

A Global Perspective on H9N2 Avian Influenza Virus

A Global Perspective on H9N2 Avian Influenza Virus

H9 Influenza Viruses: An Emerging Challenge

Avian influenza overview October 2016–August 2017

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