Phoenix surface mission operations processes

Bass, D. S.; Talley, Kevin P.

doi:10.1029/2007je003051

Cited by 11 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 1 publication

(2 reference statements)

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“…This allows scientists to use these tools to efficiently maximize science return. For example, Mars Exploration Rovers (MER) science operations strategies were designed Contents lists available at ScienceDirect journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/actaastro to accommodate the latency in communications between Earth and Mars, a delay that required separating sciencedriven decisions based on analysis of the surroundings, from the actual execution of remote field activities [1][2][3][4][5]. A science support team (the "science backroom") determined science priorities and observations to be executed by the rover the following Martian day, or "sol"; these observations, along with other necessary activities, were planned and executed by the rover engineers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Designing remote operations strategies to optimize science mission goals: Lessons learned from the Moon Mars Analog Mission Activities Mauna Kea 2012 field test

et al. 2015

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a b s t r a c tThe Moon Mars Analog Mission Activities Mauna Kea 2012 (MMAMA 2012) field campaign aimed to assess how effectively an integrated science and engineering rover team operating on a 24-h planning cycle facilitates high-fidelity science products. The science driver of this field campaign was to determine the origin of a glacially-derived deposit: was the deposit the result of (1) glacial outwash from meltwater; or (2) the result of an ice dam breach at the head of the valley?Lessons learned from MMAMA 2012 science operations include: (1) current rover science operations scenarios tested in this environment provide adequate data to yield accurate derivative products such as geologic maps; (2) instrumentation should be selected based on both engineering and science goals; and chosen during, rather than after, mission definition; and (3) paralleling the tactical and strategic science processes provides significant efficiencies that impact science return. The MER-model concept of operations utilized, in which rover operators were sufficiently facile with science intent to alter traverse and sampling plans during plan execution, increased science efficiency, gave the Science Backroom time to develop mature hypotheses and science rationales, and partially alleviated the problem of data flow being greater than the processing speed of the scientists. & 2015 IAA. Published by Elsevier Ltd. on behalf of IAA. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Designing remote operations strategies to optimize science mission goals: Lessons learned from the Moon Mars Analog Mission Activities Mauna Kea 2012 field test

et al. 2015

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“…There are a total of six separate processes which were present during the Phoenix Mission, three of which were explicitly described by the Operations Concept Document (Eagles, 2008) and in descriptions of the surface mission operations process (Bass and Talley, 2008). These are (1) Tactical Planning and its low-level follow-on counterpart, (2) Sequencing as well as a separate (3) Since the size, experience and time for training were all limited for the volunteer team available for ILSR Mission Control, it was necessary to reorganize these processes.…”

Section: Processesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Mission Control Architecture for robotic lunar sample return as field tested in an analogue deployment to the sudbury impact structure

Moores

Francis

Mader

et al. 2012

Advances in Space Research

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A Mission Control Architecture is presented for a Robotic Lunar Sample Return Mission which builds upon the experience of the landed missions of the NASA Mars Exploration Program. This architecture consists of four separate processes working in parallel at Mission Control and achieving buy-in for plans sequentially instead of simultaneously from all members of the team. These four processes were: Science Processing, Science Interpretation, Planning and Mission Evaluation. Science Processing was responsible for creating products from data downlinked from the field and is organized by instrument. Science Interpretation was responsible for determining whether or not science goals are being met and what measurements need to be taken to satisfy these goals. The Planning process, responsible for scheduling and sequencing observations, and the Evaluation process that fostered inter-process communications, reporting and documentation assisted these processes. This organization is advantageous for its flexibility as shown by the ability of the structure to produce plans for the rover every two hours, for the rapidity with which Mission Control team members may be trained and for the relatively small size of each individual team. This architecture was tested in an analogue mission to the Sudbury impact structure from June 6-17, 2011. A rover was used which was capable of developing a network of locations that could be revisited using a teach and repeat method. This allowed the science team to process several different outcrops in parallel, downselecting at each stage to ensure that the samples selected for caching were the most representative of the site. Over the course of 10 days, 18 rock samples were collected from 5 different outcrops, 182 individual field activities -such as roving or acquiring an image mosaic or other data product -were completed within 43 command cycles, and the rover travelled over 2,200 m. Data transfer from communications passes were filled to 74%. Sample triage was simulated to allow down-selection to 1kg of material for return to Earth.

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“…Bass and Talley [16] defined strategic processes as including, ''ythe generation of midterm and also longterm 'strategic' science plan that describes the possible lander actions from 4 to 11 sols in the future.'' Consequently, the strategic science operations process for MarsPhoenix involved an analysis of high-level science objectives that would be decomposed into more detailed activities.…”

Section: Mars-phoenix Missionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although not a rover mission, the Mars-Phoenix Mission Team built its operations approach on lessons learned in the Mars Exploration Rover mission [16]. A critical factor in Mars-Phoenix mission operations was managing data return from the surface within a limited return data budget, which drove the Mars-Phoenix team to operate essentially two planning processes: (1) a tactical process that dealt exclusively with those science activities whose commands were up-linked to the spacecraft each Martian day, and (2) a strategic process that considered those science activities that would be executed over the longer planning horizon of the total mission duration [16]. The requirement for teams to operate under different planning horizons was a function of mission duration.…”

Section: Mars-phoenix Missionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To that end, a given tactical planning process involved active interplay between engineering constraints and science objectives. Using these constraints and objectives, the tactical planning process generated a series of commands that could be uploaded to the Mars-Phoenix lander in time for execution in the upcoming day (see [16], Table 2, for an excellent graphic on the Mars-Phoenix tactical process).…”

Section: Mars-phoenix Missionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Desert Research and Technology Studies (DRATS) 2010 science operations: Operational approaches and lessons learned for managing science during human planetary surface missions

et al. 2013

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This article is a U.S. government work, and is not subject to copyright in the United States. CrossMark a r t i c l e i n f o b s t r a c tDesert Research and Technology Studies (Desert RATS) is a multi-year series of hardware and operations tests carried out annually in the high desert of Arizona on the San Francisco Volcanic Field. These activities are designed to exercise planetary surface hardware and operations in conditions where long-distance, multi-day roving is achievable, and they allow NASA to evaluate different mission concepts and approaches in an environment less costly and more forgiving than space. The results from the RATS tests allow selection of potential operational approaches to planetary surface exploration prior to making commitments to specific flight and mission hardware development. In previous RATS operations, the Science Support Room has operated largely in an advisory role, an approach that was driven by the need to provide a loose science mission framework that would underpin the engineering tests. However, the extensive nature of the traverse operations for 2010 expanded the role of the science operations and tested specific operational approaches. Science mission operations approaches from the Apollo and Mars-Phoenix missions were merged to become the baseline for this test. Six days of traverse operations were conducted during each week of the 2-week test, with three traverse days each week conducted with voice and data communications continuously available, and three traverse days conducted with only two 1-hour communications periods per day. Within this framework, the team evaluated integrated science operations management using real-time, tactical science operations to oversee daily crew activities, and strategic level evaluations of science data and daily traverse results during a post-traverse planning shift. During continuous communications, both tactical and strategic teams were employed. On days when communications were reduced to only two communications periods per day, only a strategic team was employed. The Science Operations Team found that, if communications are good and down-linking of science data is ensured, high quality science returns is possible regardless of communications. What is absent from reduced communications is the scientific interaction between the crew on the planet and the scientists on the ground. These scientific interactions were a critical part of the science process and significantly improved mission science return over reduced communications conditions. The test also showed that the quality of science return is not measurable by simple numerical quantities but is, in fact, based on strongly non-quantifiable factors, such as the interactions between the crew and the Science Operations Teams. Although the metric evaluation data suggested some trends, there was not sufficient granularity in the data or specificity in the metrics to allow those trends to be understood on numerical data alone.Published by Elsevier Ltd. on behalf of IAA.

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Phoenix surface mission operations processes

Cited by 11 publications

References 1 publication

Designing remote operations strategies to optimize science mission goals: Lessons learned from the Moon Mars Analog Mission Activities Mauna Kea 2012 field test

Designing remote operations strategies to optimize science mission goals: Lessons learned from the Moon Mars Analog Mission Activities Mauna Kea 2012 field test

A Mission Control Architecture for robotic lunar sample return as field tested in an analogue deployment to the sudbury impact structure

Desert Research and Technology Studies (DRATS) 2010 science operations: Operational approaches and lessons learned for managing science during human planetary surface missions

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