Privacy 2017
DOI: 10.4324/9781315246024-1
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Philosophical Views on the Value of Privacy

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Cited by 9 publications
(11 citation statements)
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“…From a legal perspective, issues of privacy have been discussed extensively for well over 100 years (Warren & Brandeis, 1890). Philosophical discourse on topics such as privacy and self‐determination has a history so well‐seasoned that it makes a mere century of legal scholarship seem quaint by comparison (see Negley, 1966). Importantly, big data methods and technologies have not been engineered in an ethical vacuum, released to world with no concern for consequences.…”
Section: The Personality Panoramamentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…From a legal perspective, issues of privacy have been discussed extensively for well over 100 years (Warren & Brandeis, 1890). Philosophical discourse on topics such as privacy and self‐determination has a history so well‐seasoned that it makes a mere century of legal scholarship seem quaint by comparison (see Negley, 1966). Importantly, big data methods and technologies have not been engineered in an ethical vacuum, released to world with no concern for consequences.…”
Section: The Personality Panoramamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Rosenthal & Hooley, 2010), aging (e.g. Nye, Allemand, Gosling, Potter, & Roberts, 2016), and workplace attainment (e.g. Hough, 2001).…”
Section: Approaching a Modern Understanding Of Personality Datamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…• privacy in the context of criminal justice sentencing may be justifiably traded for explicability, which guarantees a person transparency with respect to how a sentence is calculated; • conversely, explicability may be traded in systems that process social media data, where privacy preserving protocols may render it impossible to explicate with respect to processing specifically to the person [22][23][24]. ]; however, and contrastingly, regarding the latter there is considerable contention [27][28][29][30]. Indeed, it is an open question as to whether or not a first-principles philosophical defence of privacy is required for privacy to be considered a fundamental (legal) right, or, if it is sufficient, as it most often the case, that the 'fundamental right of privacy' is derived from the notion of 'human dignity' [31,32], see also GDPR (Article 88).…”
Section: Multiplicity Of Valuesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The Recital appears to equivocate respect for human dignity with respect for privacy. Metaphysically, this is a 'thick' concept entailing significant argument: at present there is no philosophical consensus that privacy is primary and a fundamental value, indeed, it may be argued that the value of privacy has no foundational status but rather is a derivative of modern political structures [26,27]. Expanding upon this, it is important to distinguish between discussions of privacy as a fundamental right qua law, and privacy as a fundamental right qua the philosophical tradition.…”
Section: Context Sensitivitymentioning
confidence: 99%