2015
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0684-6
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Philosophical thought experiments as heuristics for theory discovery

Abstract: The growing literature on philosophical thought experiments has so far focused almost exclusively on the role of thought experiments in confirming or refuting philosophical hypotheses or theories. In this paper we draw attention to an additional and largely ignored role that thought experiments frequently play in our philosophical practice: some thought experiments do not merely serve as means for testing various philosophical hypotheses or theories, but also serve as facilitators for conceiving and articulati… Show more

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Cited by 29 publications
(12 citation statements)
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“…Thought-experiments are performed only occasionally, one after the other, without coordinating them with each other and with theorizing. At most they follow the scheme "question → theory → hypothesis → experiment → analysis → revision to theory → repeat," as for instance Gettier experiments in epistemology (Gettier, 1963;Praëm & Steglich-Petersen, 2015). They are not systematically controlled for variables like implicit biases of the experimenter.…”
Section: Test Many Theories In Many Waysmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Thought-experiments are performed only occasionally, one after the other, without coordinating them with each other and with theorizing. At most they follow the scheme "question → theory → hypothesis → experiment → analysis → revision to theory → repeat," as for instance Gettier experiments in epistemology (Gettier, 1963;Praëm & Steglich-Petersen, 2015). They are not systematically controlled for variables like implicit biases of the experimenter.…”
Section: Test Many Theories In Many Waysmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These issues are not sufficiently discussed in the literature. The latter addresses what a thought-experiment is (Sorensen, 1992), how thought-experiments are processed (Nersessian, 2007), whether and how they can provide evidence without empirical observation (Brown, 1991), what their function and scope is (Praëm & Steglich-Petersen, 2015), how they relate to arguments (Norton, 2004), and how to formalize them (Dohrn, 2018;Williamson, 2007). If incommensurability problems are discussed, then mostly with a sceptical twist (Machery, 2017).…”
Section: Test Many Theories In Many Waysmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Thought-experiments are performed only occasionally, one after the other, without coordinating them with each other and with theorizing. At most they follow the scheme "question → theory → hypothesis → experiment → analysis → revision to theory → repeat," as for instance Gettier experiments in epistemology (Gettier, 1963;Praëm & Steglich-Petersen, 2015). They are not systematically controlled for variables like implicit biases of the experimenter.…”
Section: Test Many Theories In Many Waysmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…also Praëm and Steglich-Petersen (2015) for a discussion of constructive and destructive thought experiments in both philosophy and in science.…”
Section: The Structure Of Thought Experiments and The Evidential Role Of Judgementsmentioning
confidence: 99%