Philosophical foundations of partial belief models

Bazzoni, André

doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2016.09.001

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…Brief mention may be made here of a scenario under which the concurrent endorsement of inconsistent beliefs might not be utterly irrational. There is a case for the view that at least some beliefs may be endorsed probabilistically (Bazzoni, 2017;Leitgeb, 2017), that is, with a degree of confidence or commitment rather than simply as "true" or "false" (so-called binary belief). In addition to outright beliefs and disbeliefs, therefore, there may be an array of intermediate "not-quite-beliefs" (Tumulty, 2012) or partial beliefs to which one's commitment is equivocal to some extent.…”

Section: Belief Inconsistencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Ethics of Belief in Paranormal Phenomena

2022

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The philosophical school of Evidentialism holds that people should form, amend, and relinquish a belief wholly in accordance with the available evidence for that belief. This paper reviews the extent to which believers in paranormal phenomena respect Evidentialism’s so-called “ethics of belief.” The analysis focuses on several common violations of evidentialist principles, namely, those pertaining to belief formation as a moral issue, belief inflexibility, belief inconsistency, confirmation bias, and disconfirmation effects. Despite some gaps and methodological shortcomings in the available data, the empirical literature documents an association between paranormal beliefs and a broad lack of sympathy with evidentialist ethics, although the effect sizes of these relations typically are small. The possible basis of this characteristic is briefly explored.

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Section: Belief Inconsistencymentioning

confidence: 99%